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ABSTRACT
Social intrapreneurs occupy an intersectional space within the large
corporate form at the crossroads of innovation, profit, and social
good. They are often described as "disruptive" because they devise
new ways to tackle problems, usually social in nature, in a manner
that disrupts traditional operating models or long-standing
assumptions. Although much has been written about social
intrapreneurs in managerial literature, legal literature has been silent.
This Article reverses that trend and develops a theory of social
intrapreneurship from a corporate law perspective. Specifically, this
Article posits that social intrapreneurship in terms of praxis,
characteristics, and process can be conceptualized as serving a
bridging function between discrete parts of a corporation's business
and, on a meta-level, between the canonical schism of "profit" and
"social good."
To be clear, the argument advanced in this Article is not that social
intrapreneurship is the antidote to all corporate ills, but rather that in
its most successful form, social intrapreneurship redefines the
boundaries of a corporation's business and social potential. Social
intrapreneurship has implications for broader policy debates, such as
those related to matters of corporate purpose, the choice of
organizational forms, and the need for tri-sector cooperation.
INTRODUCTION
A little less than a decade ago, two employees at Vodafone PLC
noted a disconnect-although half of the population in Kenya
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had mobile phones, less than 20% of Kenyans had access to formal
banking services. I Struck by this gap, Vodafone employees Nick
Hughes and Susie Lonie ideated an innovative mobile banking
network called "M-PESA" that allowed Kenyans to perform banking
activities via their mobile phones. 2 M-PESA's success has been
twofold: first, it effectively opened up access to banking services
without the need to build brick-and-mortar banks, and second, it
contributed to Vodafone's financial bottom line.
3
Vodafone's story does not stand alone. At many large for-profit
corporations, such as Dow Chemicals Co., Unilever Inc., and Danone
SA, individuals like Nick and Susie exist.4 Often termed "social
intrapreneurs," these employees spot gaps between intra-firm
capabilities and extra-firm societal needs, and create new products,
services, and/or practices that link. business growth and profitability
with social value creation.
Social intrapreneurship has attracted a lot of attention in business
5literature, as well as in media and corporate circles. For example, a
2014 Forbes article described social intrapreneurs as "quickly
becoming the most valuable employees at many companies because
they are good for the bottom line, good for the brand, and good for
I See IGNACIO MAS & DAN RADCLIFFE, BILL & MELINDA GATES FOUNDATION,
MOBILE PAYMENTS GO VIRAL: M-PESA IN KENYA 2 n.5 (2010), http://siteresources.world
bank.org/AFRICAEXT/Resources/258643-1271798012256/M-PESA-Kenya.pdf;
SUSTAINABILITY, THE SOCIAL INTRAPRENEUR: A FIELD GUIDE FOR CORPORATE
CHANGEMAKERS 7 (2008), http://www.echoinggreen.org/sites/default/files/TheSocial
_lntrapreneurs.pdf.
2 SUSTAINABILITY, supra note I, at 7.
3 See Matt Twomey, Cashless Africa: Kenya's Smash Success with Mobile Money,
CNBC.COM (Nov. 11, 2013, 7:00 AM), http://www.cnbc.com/2013/1 1/1 I/cashless-africa
-kenyas-smash-success-with-mobile-money.html.
4 See infra Part 1; Appendix.
5 See GERALD F. DAVIS & CHRISTOPHER J. WHITE, CHANGING YOUR COMPANY FROM
THE INSIDE OUT: A GUIDE FOR SOCIAL INTRAPRENEURS (2015); DAVID GRAYSON ET AL.,
SOCIAL INTRAPRENEURISM AND ALL THAT JAZZ: How BUSINESS INNOVATORS ARE
HELPING TO BUILD A MORE SUSTAINABLE WORLD (2014); David Armano, Move Over
Entrepreneurs, Here Come the Intrapreneurs, FORBES (May 21, 2012, 12:11 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/onmarketing/2012/05/21/move-over-entrepreneurs-here-come
-the-intrapreneurs/; Scott MacFarland, Are Social Intrapreneurs Emerging in Your
Company?, HUFFINGTON POST BLOG (Apr. 22, 2014, 5:59 AM), http://www.huffington
post.com/scott-macfarland/are-social-intrapreneurs- b_4818701. html; Judy Samuelson,
Social Intrapreneurs: Disruptive Innovators on the Inside, FORBES (Apr. 7, 2013, 8:00
PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/skollworldforum/2013/04/07/social-intrapreneurs
-disruptive-innovators-on-the-inside; Emma Stewart, How Does a Social Intrapreneur Add
Value to a Business?, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 11, 2013, 10:14 AM), http://www.the
guardian.com/sustainable-business/social-intrapreneur-value-business.
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staff morale.",6 Relatedly, several corporations such as Google, Inc.,
BMW (through its foundation), and Barclays PLC have created
processes for encouraging and supporting intrapreneurship, and a
2008 article in The Economist speculated that social intrapreneurs
were arguably "[t]he greatest agents for sustainable change."7
In addition to praising the potential value that social intrapreneurs
bring to the corporate table, the business literature and practitioners in
the intrapreneurship space often acknowledge and wrestle with the
structural organizational obstacles that social intrapreneurs face. 8 Of
prime concern are organizational structure constraints that hinder
access to resources, obtaining approval from "higher-ups" for
initiatives as they move from ideation to development, and securing a
viable budget.
However, yet another structural feature that should be considered,
but which has not received due consideration in intrapreneurial
discussions is the effect of corporate law on intrapreneurship.
Intrapreneurs operate within organizations, many of which are
corporations, and by extension corporations operate within the bounds
of corporate law. In turn corporate law provides a backdrop of rules
and norms that govern the rights, responsibilities, and relationships of
the board, officers, shareholders, and other constituents. Thus,
corporate law is itself a structural feature that merits consideration.
This Article is the first to contemplate how corporate law
potentially impacts social intrapreneurship and, concomitantly, how
social intrapreneurship contributes to academic discussions on the
nature of corporations. Of particular interest to this Article is
contemplating how corporate law's theoretical treatment of the nature
of the relationship between the concepts of "profit" and "social
interest" in the context of the for-profit corporation intersects with the
on-the-ground practice of intrapreneurship. In this regard, this Article
argues that social intrapreneurship represents a private ordering model
that serves a gap-filling function between axioms of "profit" and
"social interest." While corporate law and attendant corporate law
6 Ashoka, 2014's Most Valuable Employee: The Social Intrapreneur, FORBES (Jan. 24,
2014, 12:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ashoka/2014/01/24/2014s-most-valuable
-employee-the-social-intrapreneur/.
7 Social Enterpreneurs: Agents of Change, ECONOMIST (Jan. 31, 2008), http:/www
.economist.com/node/ 10601356.
8 Nick de Mey, Bd. of Innovation, Webinar: Experiment to Fight Red Tape: Board of
Innovation Pays the Expenses of Corporate Intrapreneurs (Aug 18, 2015, 1 1:00am-
12:00pm); see also DAVIS & WHITE, supra note 5.
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theory have always wrestled with the appropriate way to describe the
relationship between a corporation's profit-seeking activity and the
social value of that activity, social intrapreneurship potentially offers
a practical model for mediating between the two.
This Article develops the analysis in four parts. First, Part I
provides a descriptive overview of social-intrapreneurship activities
based on research and analysis of a cross-section of over twenty large,
for-profit corporations with identified social intrapreneurs. 9 Part II
considers the normative landscape in which corporations and, by
extension, social intrapreneurs operate. As such, Part II traces the
contours of the normative debate on corporate purpose, not with an
eye toward resolving the debate or advocating for a particular view,
but with the objective of demonstrating the longstanding bifurcation
that exists between concepts of profit and public interest. Part II
concludes by surveying current data-points (such as the rise of benefit
corporate forms and the push for new business models like "conscious
capitalism" or "creating shared value"), which seek to amend,
override, or present alternatives for "opting out" of the socio-profit
divide.10  Part III introduces and analyzes the idea of social
intrapreneurship as serving a gap-filling function against the backdrop
of the noted axiomatic divide between profit and social purpose. Part
IV considers potential legal concerns presented by social
intrapreneurship-such as the effectiveness of current fiduciary duty
law to monitor intrapreneurial activities and the allocation of
intellectual property rights-and contemplates potential doctrinal,
organizational, and contractual solutions to address these concerns.
This Article concludes by offering some thoughts on the policy
implications of social intrapreneurship. Specifically, points of
intersect with broader policy discussions on corporate purpose, choice
of organizational form, and the need for corporate initiatives in
meeting social and environmental global challenges.
9 The research methodology underpinning this Article is a combination of first-hand
interviews, literature review, and in-depth case studies. The intrapreneurs and, by
extension, the intrapreneurial practices, analyzed in this Article have been identified as
such by third-party organizations who are active in the intrapreneurial space. Such
organizations include the Aspen Institute, the Skoll Foundation, Echoing Green, and the
Ashoka Foundation.
10 See generally JOHN MACKEY & RAJ SISODIA, CONSCIOUS CAPITALISM: LIBERATING
THE HEROIC SPIRIT OF BUSINESS (2013); Michael E. Porter & Mark R. Kramer, Creating
Shared Value, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan.-Feb. 2011, https://hbr.org/2011/01/the-big-idea
-creating-shared-value.
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The utility in examining social intrapreneurship through a
corporate law lens is particularly salient in light of renewed interests
by academics, policy-makers, business leaders, and the media on
frameworks for integrating social values and sustainability into core
business practices.
To be clear, the argument advanced in this Article is not that social
intrapreneurship is a silver bullet that can solve all corporate ills.
Rather, that the practice of social intrapreneurship is a vital yet
underexplored realm of corporate activity that provides a discrete
means of gap-filling between structural schisms of profit and social
interest.
Relatedly, social intrapreneurs act as a valuable tool that allow
their host firm to expand its mission beyond shareholders to society at
large,' a key characteristic that is valued by those entering the work
force. 12 In their most successful form, social intrapreneurs reimagine
the existing boundaries of their host corporation's potential.' 3 Or to
use former Delaware Chancellor William T. Allen's words, they
provide a meaningful bridge between corporate law's "alpha of
[profit]" and the "omega of relationships."' 4
I
SOCIAL INTRAPRENEURSHIP: PRAXIS, PROCESS, AND
CHARACTERISTICS
The term "intrapreneur" is often credited to Gifford Pinchot and
Elizabeth S. Pinchot, who first used the term in a 1978 paper entitled
Intra-Corporate Entrepreneurs.'5  Today several definitions of
"intrapreneur" and by extension "intrapreneurship" abound. While
there is no single definition of intrapreneur or intrapreneurship,
existing definitions all capture the idea of a corporate employee who
I I See Tamara C. Belinfanti, Shareholder Cultivation and New Governance, 38 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 789, 815 (2014) ("A firm's mission should then inform the narrative that the firm
develops to explain its value proposition and operational strategies to shareholders, other
stakeholders, and society at large.").
12 See Jay Coen Gilbert et al., Today Marks a Tipping Point in the Evolution of
Capitalism, FORBES (July 17, 2013, 9:30 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/skoll
worldforum/2013/07/I 7/today-marks-a-tipping-point-in-the-evolution-of-capitalism/print/.
13 See SUSTAINABILITY, supra note 1, at4, 5 (2008).
14 See William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic Conception of the Business Corporation,
14 CARDOZO L. REV. 261, 273 (1992).
15 See Gifford Pinchot IlI & Elizabeth S. Pinchot, Intra-Corporate Entrepreneurship,
INTRAPRENEUR.COM (Fall 1978), http://intrapreneur.com/MainPages/History/lntraCorp
.html.
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is able to reimagine the potential for their host corporation and who
develops a product, service, and/or solution that links business growth
to social value creation.
For example, a 2008 report, The Social Intrapreneur: A Field
Guide for Corporate Changemakers (the "Field Guide Report"),
defined a social intrapreneur in three ways: (1) "[s]omeone who
works inside major corporations or organizations to develop and
promote practical solutions to social or environmental challenges
where progress is currently stalled by market failures," (2)
"[s]omeone who applies the principles of social entrepreneurship
inside a major organization," and (3) "[o]ne characterized by an
'insider-outsider' approach." 16 Similarly, the Aspen Institute Business
and Society First Movers Fellowship Program defines
intrapreneurship in relation to the employee's demonstrated ability to
"unite business growth with a sustainable society in the products and
services they are developing."' 17 The program identifies insiders who
have successfully leveraged the resources and capabilities of their
organization to create new business solutions, which add value both
to society and to the corporation's operations. 8
Social intrapreneurs may pursue their ideas individually or as part
of a team. In their most successful and idealized form, social
intrapreneurs devise products and/or solutions that deliver enhanced
value to society and to their host corporation. The Field Guide Report
summarized their value as follows:
Social intrapreneurs are creating and delivering new business
models. They compel their host corporations to look outside their
comfort zones-to see both the strategic risks and profound
opportunities that exist beyond the purview of traditional business
units. They are not satisfied with suboptimal equilibriums, where
markets work well for some, but not at all for others. Their adept
opposable minds exist to juggle dilemmas and catalyze new visions,
products, services and solutions-some of which may fall beneath
the radar today, but will eventually enable a scale of change that
delivers value to society and business well into the future. 
19
Social intrapreneurs share key traits with other innovative players,
namely entrepreneurs and innovators. These traits include: (1) a desire
16 SUSTAINABILITY, supra note 1, at 4.
17 See Aspen Institute First Movers, ASPEN INST., http://www.aspeninstitute.org/policy
-work/business-society/corporate-programs/first-movers-fellowship-program (last visited
Oct. 17, 2015).
18 Id.
19 SUSTAINABILITY, supra note 1, at 5.
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to solve social problems; (2) the ability to innovate and devise new
business solutions; (3) the ability to discern market trends; (4) the
ability to recognize failed strategies and in response, pivot and retool;
and (5) a belief in the positive role that business can play in society.
As previously mentioned, however, social intrapreneurs differ from
these other innovative players in several respects. I
First, unlike entrepreneurs, social intrapreneurs elect to effect
social change from within large corporations rather than exiting and
forming their own venture. 20 The Field Guide Report noted that both
social intrapreneurs and social entrepreneurs both "regularly scan the
horizon for new ways to solve societal challenges" and "com[e] up
with key concepts, business models, products and services that will
open out new opportunity spaces., 2 1 However, because the social
intrapreneur is not self-employed, but instead works from within a
corporation, the report noted that intrapreneurs are adept at "[tying]
into the processes and business case elements of [their] venture., 22
The report also notes that social intrapreneurs "potentially provide
social entrepreneurs with a new point of access to multinational
business and all it has to offer in terms of investment capital, global
reach, resource and scale."23 Accordingly, while both intrapreneurs
and entrepreneurs are innovators, they operate in separate spheres
within the realm of innovation. Thus, assuming "I" represented
innovators/innovation, "e" represented social entrepreneurs, and "i"
represented social intrapreneurs, the relationship between the two
could be visualized as follows:
Diagram 1
e0Di0
Second, vis-A-vis innovators, while all social intrapreneurs are
innovators, not all innovators are social intrapreneurs. Thus, if social
20 Id. at 2.
21 Id. at 13.
22 Id.
23 Id. at 5.
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intrapreneurs were represented by "i" and innovators/innovation by
"I," the relationship could be portrayed as follows:
Diagram 2
1
0
According to the Field Guide Report, one characteristic that
distinguishes intrapreneurial behavior from merely innovative
behavior is that intrapreneurs are inherently driven to develop new
products, services, or solutions that both solve a societal problem and
return profits, rather than being driven purely by a profit maximand.24
Conceptually, this distinction is helpful, although in practice it may
easily disintegrate. If, for example, an innovator belongs in circle "I"
but not in sub-circle "i" above, yet masks his profit maximand
preferences and instead expresses concerns for benefitting both the
financial and social bottom line, such a person would get counted in
the intrapreneur category. Conversely, envision a true intrapreneur-
someone who belongs in sub-circle "i" but who is unsure whether her
innovative idea that addresses a social problem will be embraced by
superiors and thus decides to camouflage her true self and presents
the idea solely in terms of profit. Under the Field Guide Report's
distinction, she would be represented as an innovator and not an
intrapreneur.
Third, when compared to other intra-corporate actors whose work
also involves a focus on external social needs, an efficient way to
distinguish is to look at whether external social needs are part of the
employee's core mandate. Examples of intra-corporate actors whose
core mandate explicitly includes considerations of external societal
needs are those hired for corporate social responsibility (CSR)
matters; those who are part of a corporation's "ESG"
(Environmental/Social/Governance) team; those who are part of a
corporation's so-called "impact investing" arm; and those who focus
on corporate charitable contributions. In contrast, social intrapreneurs
24 Id. at 13.
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traditionally do not.25 As a result, unlike other socially driven intra-
corporate actors, social intrapreneurs must negotiate with their host
corporation if they wish to implement their innovations. Therefore,
using the same notations as above, with "C" representing CSR or
sustainability initiatives, the relationship between social intrapreneurs
and their C-counterparts could be illustrated as follows:
Diagram 3
However, the relationship between social intrapreneurs,
entrepreneurs, innovators, and CSR/sustainability actors is fluid rather
than static: any conception should allow for movement among the
groups, as well as the adoption and assimilation by one group of traits
and strategies from the other. For example, while some corporations
employ a stand-alone CSR model, where CSR initiatives are divorced
from the corporation's core business, many corporations have what
can be viewed as an integrated-CSR model, whereby the
corporation's CSR initiatives are an extension of and/or intimately
tied to its business model. An example of the latter can be seen in
Walgreens's "Shot@Life" Initiative, which donates a flu shot to
someone in need each time a customer purchases and receives a flu
26
shot at Walgreens.
25 This Article uses the word "traditionally" because, as discussed immediately later in
Part 1, as corporations begin to realize the value of social intrapreneurship, the process of
social intrapreneurship has become formalized. For instance, Harvard University's
Innovation Lab (or i-lab) teamed up with consulting firm IDEO to create a formal paid
internship program called Future Lab (now renamed Bits + Blocks Lab), where students
work for nine weeks at Fidelity Investments to develop skills of an intrapreneur. See Bits +
Blocks Lab: Trust & Transactions, HARV. INNOVATION LAB, https://i-lab.harvard.edu
/experiential-learning/future-lab (last visited Aug. 28, 2015).
26 Walgreens and United Nations Foundation Launch "Get a Shot. Give a Shot"
Campaign, Kicking Off Second Year of Collaboration to Provide Life-Saving Vaccines for
Children in Developing Countries, SHOT@LIFE (Sept. 9, 2014), http://shotatlife.orgnews
-media/press-releases/walgreens-and-united-nations- .html.
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Intrapreneurs exist at various levels of a corporation's structure,
from the top rungs of CEO and CFO (like Whole Food's CEO John
Mackey) to deep within the corporation's structure.2 7 A key challenge
for the latter type of intrapreneur is that their intrapreneurial
contributions could go hidden and unrealized without the necessary
conduit to help bring their ideas to fruition-what the Field Guide
Report refers to as a "gatekeeper" or "catalyst.,
2 8
Relatedly, because corporations understand the potential power of
intrapreneurial activity, some corporations have institutionalized
intrapreneurial practices by creating corporation-supported
intrapreneurial initiatives. For example, Google, Inc. allots a certain
amount of time each week (the so-called "20% program") in which all
employees are free to think and come up with the proverbial next big
idea. 29 At Lockheed Martin, Inc., members of its "Skunk Work"
group operate as their own division and are explicitly given free-reign
to develop innovative ideas; however, this is not necessarily an
intrapreneurial practice (or put differently, Skunk Work team
members would fall in the "I" in Diagram 2 above, but not necessarily
in "i"). Meanwhile, some corporations, such as Barclays PLC,
sponsor intemal competitions that invite employees to develop and
submit intrapreneurial ideas. 3 1 Part of the prize for the winners is
sponsorship to participate in The Intrapreneur Lab run in
collaboration with Accenture Development Partnerships and a
number of business schools globally.3 2 More broadly speaking, some
27 See Steve Denning, The New Management Paradigm & John Mackey's Whole
Foods, FORBES (Jan. 5, 2013, 2:48 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/stevedenning/2013
/01 /05/the-new-management-paradigm-john-mackeys-whole-foods/.
28 SUSTAINABILITY, supra note 1, at 14.
29 See Chris Trimble, Google and the Myth of Free Time, HARV. BUS. REV., Aug. 17,
2010, http://blogs.hbr.org/2010/08/free-time-innovation/; Ashoka, 2015's Most Valuable
Organization: A Changemaker Company, FORBES (Sept. 17, 2015, 12:00 AM),
http://www forbes.com/sites/ashoka/2015/09/17/2015s-most-valuable-organization-the
-changemaker-company/ (describing "changemaker companies" which attract, engage, and
retain the top talent with three qualities: (1) implementing strong mandates and executive
alignment towards creating social value; (2) integrating social impact objectives directly
into corporate strategy; and (3) implementing structures in such a way as to allow for
change-making within the organization such as professional development, training
sessions, engagement in social impact, etc.).
30 See generally Skunk Works, LOCKHEED MARTIN, http://www.lockheedmartin.com/us
/aeronautics/skunkworks.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2015).
31 David Grayson, Helping Social Intrapreneurship Reach a Tipping Point, THE
GUARDIAN (Mar. 14, 2014, 1:00 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business
/social-intrapreneurship-tipping-point.
32 Id.
20151
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corporations try to encourage a general culture of innovation by
working in open office spaces and/or adopting a holocracy system.
3 3
While there is no singular model for social intrapreneurs, one
common trait of successful intrapreneurs is that they are able to see
connections between their corporation's capabilities and outside
societal needs. Another common trait is their ability to tap into their
corporation's business model to create products, services, or internal
solutions that reshape the corporation's relationship with society in a
mutually beneficial way. The Field Guide Report offered the
following observation: Successful social intrapreneurs understand
business processes and priorities, and have a sharp nose for
identifying "suboptimal equilibriums, where markets work well for
some, but not at all for others." These intrapreneurs develop
innovative business models for addressing these suboptimal
equilibriums and encourage their host organization to look beyond
their comfort zones to see new opportunities for the business. As
such, they act as an interface between the employer-organization and
the world of social enterprise, and understand how to articulate the
"business case" for their proposed venture.
34
In addition to coordinating resources on a micro level within their
individual corporations, on a macro level, social intrapreneurs have
the potential to fundamentally change the business landscape. In this
regard, the Field Guide Report compared social intrapreneurs to
beavers, stating that:
Intrapreneurs have the potential to profoundly reshape their
landscapes and to create whole cascades of new opportunity for
those around them [just like] a beaver. Key elements of success
include ... perseverance in implementing small steps to achieve a
clear intent and vision-but in addition the beaver brings its ability
to engineer new dams and channels of value and to bend the
resources of the wider ecosystem to the task at hand, and so
transform the landscape. 35
33 See, e.g., Lana Bortolot, Designing a Better Office Space, ENTREPRENEUR (July 26,
2014), http://www.entrepreneur.com/article/235375 (discussing general culture of
innovation and open office spaces); Lisa Wirthman, Is Flat Better? Zappos Ditches
Hierarchy to Improve Company Performance, FORBES (Jan. 7, 2014, 8:52 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/sungardas/2014/01/07/is-flat-better-zappos-ditches-hierarchy
-to-improve-company-performance/ (discussing Zappos's move to flat management--or
"[h]olacracy, a flatter operating structure with no job titles or managers"-and studies that
show flat companies may actually perform better).
34 See SUSTAINABILITY, supra note 1, at 5, 13.
35 Id. at 30.
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Continuing the beaver analogy, the report noted that beavers are
known for "building dams in rivers and streams, and then setting up
homes, or lodges, in the resulting pond." 36 The beaver's dam building
usually benefits not only the beaver but the "wider ecosystem" as
well, whether it be in "incidental benefits [like] flood control,"
reduced erosion, or the restoration of wetlands.37
The comparison to beavers is a helpful metaphor for visualizing the
impact that social intrapreneurs can have on their host corporation
and, in turn, on their host corporation's actions vis-A-vis society. The
balance of Part I considers specific examples that reveal the nature of
the relationships between intrapreneurs and their host corporation
and, in turn, between the host corporation and external communities.
Consider the following case studies:
Case Study 1: Vodafone & M-PESA. Vodafone is in the
telecommunications industry and is primarily focused on mobile
telecommunication. 38 As highlighted in the Introduction, two
employees of Vodafone developed a business model in response to
Kenya's access-to-banking problem. 39 The model M-PESA was
based on the insight that as of 2006, 80% of the population had no
access to the formal banking network,4 0 even though 54% of the
population owned mobile phones. M-PESA ("M" stands for mobile
and "Pesa" is Swahili for money) allows users to move money and
transfer funds through their phone, thereby creating a more efficient
and cost-effective way of transacting their financial affairs.4' Of
course today, mobile banking is much more widespread, but,
unbeknownst to many, its growth stemmed from a response to a
societal problem. Not surprisingly, in addition to benefitting Kenyan
society, Vodafone has also financially benefited, as it has been able to
42forge and secure a wider network of customers. As a testament to
36 Id. at 43.
37 Id.
38 About Us, VODAFONE, http://www.vodafone.com/content/index/about/about-us.html
(last visited Oct. 17, 2015).
39 See MAS & RADCLIFFE, supra note 1, at 1-2; SUSTAINABILITY, supra note 1, at 7.
40 FINACCESS, FINACCESS NATIONAL SURVEY 2009: DYNAMICS OF KENYA'S
CHANGING FINANCIAL LANDSCAPE 11-12 (2009), http://www.fsdkenya.org/finaccess
/documents/09-06-1 0_FinAccessFA09_Report.pdf.
41 MAS & RADCLIFFE, supra note 1, at 1.
42 See Twomey, supra note 3.
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the business success of M-PESA, on March 31, 2014, Vodafone
announced that it was launching its M-PESA platform in Europe.
43
Case Study 2: Procter & Gamble and PUR. The story of Procter &
Gamble (P&G) and PUR is illustrative of a different kind of
intrapreneurship where, instead of developing a new product,
technology, or business model, the intrapreneur takes an existing
product, technology, or business model and reconceptualizes its use.
In 2002, P&G launched PUR, an on-the-spot water decontaminant,
which was designed to address the problem of access to clean
water44  a problem that, according to UNICEF, affects
approximately 768 million people across the globe.45 At first, P&G
attempted to market PUR commercially, but found that it lacked the
capacity to reach remote rural areas in parts of the developing world
that could benefit the most.46 A P&G employee, Dr. Philip Souter,
noted that one significant roadblock was in convincing skeptical
villagers that the cause of many of their health problems was related
to the contaminated water they had been consuming. Another P&G
employee, Dr. Greg Allgood, reconceptualized PUR from a direct
commercial selling model and persuaded P&G to convert PUR into a
nonprofit venture called the "P&G Children's Safe Drinking Water
program."'4 8 Under this new nonprofit model, PUR would be provided
at cost to humanitarian organizations, and, additionally, P&G would
donate extra funding to provide education about its use and benefits.49
The P&G PUR initiative is an example of the types of activities that
would fall into the grey, shaded area in Diagram 3, above. Dr.
Allgood had the intrapreneurial insight to reconceptualize an existing
business model, but the model that resulted had social need as part of
its core mandate, thus making it more like a CSR or philanthropic
program. P&G later sold its PUR Water Filter division to Helen of
43 Press Release, Vodafone, Vodafone M-Pesa Comes to Europe for the First Time
(Mar. 31, 2014), http://www.vodafone.com/content/index/media/vodafone-group-releases
/2014/m-pesa-romania.html.
44 Sarah Ellison & Eric Bellrrfan, Clean Water, No Profit, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 23, 2005,
12:01 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB 110910057933261072.
45 Stephanie Adickman, How Your Dollars Turn Into Clean Water, UNICEF U.S. FUND
(Mar. 18, 2014), http://www.unicefusa.org/stories/mission/survival/water/tap-project/how
-your-dollars-turn-clean-water/7570.
46 James Addis, PUR Genius, WORLD VISION BLOG (July 6, 2011), http://blog.world
vision.org/causes/pur-genius.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Id.
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Troy Ltd. in December 2011 for an undisclosed amount, and the
division was expected to exceed $110 million in sales by the time the
transaction was complete.
5 0
Case Study 3: Hindustan Unilever. Unilever is a large
conglomerate that produces several well-known brands like Dove
soap, Lipton tea, and Bertolli olive oil.51 While Unilever's products
are available throughout India, the company recognized that there
were several rural villages in India that had no access to its
products. An insider at Unilever recognized that many of these rural
villages had high rates of unemployment and the segment of the
population that was most likely to be unemployed was women.53
From this insight, the Unilever insider was able to create a bridge
between the societal problem of rural unemployment that
disproportionately affects women, and the corporation's interest in
successfully reaching what were thought to be inaccessible rural
markets.54 The idea was Project Shakti, an initiative that employs
women in rural villages to distribute Unilever's products.55 Shakti
currently employs approximately seventy thousand entrepreneurs
("Shakti Ammas"), who in turn distribute to approximately four
million households, and because of Shakti are now able to provide
some of the more basic needs for their families like food, education,
56and a modest home. The scale and impact of Shakti grew
dramatically, and Unilever anticipated in 2010 that it would recruit,
train, and employ an additional forty-eight thousand Shakti Ammas
50 Helen of Troy Buys PUR Water Filters from P&G, FORBES (Dec. 6, 2011, 10:17
AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/marketnewsvideo/2011/1 2/06/helen-of-troy-buys-pur
-water-filters-from-pg/. However, the sale did not include P&G's Children's Safe Drinking
Water philanthropy program that utilized the water filters to provide clean water to
children in underdeveloped countries. See Helen of Troy Buying PUR Business from P&G,
USA TODAY MONEY (Dec. 6, 2011, 11:01 AM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com
/money/industries/story/2011-12-06/Helen-of-Troy-acquisition/51671312/1; About Us,
P&G CHILDREN'S SAFE DRINKING WATER PROGRAM, https://www.csdw.org/csdw/about
-childrens-safe-drinking-water.shtml (last visited Oct. 17, 2015).
51 Our Brands, UNILEVER, http://www.unilever.com/brands-in-action/view-brands.aspx
(last visited Oct. 17, 2015).
52 See SUSTAINABILITY, supra note 1, at 40.
53 See id.
54 See id.
55 Enhancing Livelihoods Through Project Shakti, HINDUSTAN UNILEVER LIMITED,
http://www.hul.co.in/sustainable-living-2015/casestudies/Project-Shakti.aspx (last visited
Oct. 17, 2015).
56 See id.
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by 2015. 57 While reaching the rural population was perhaps directly
driven by a profit-making ethos, the way in which the company
decided to reach this rural population advanced not just corporate but
social interests.
Case Study 4: Danone Bangladesh. Danone is a leader in the food
58industry and is probably best known for its yogurts. Bangladesh has
a high rate of malnutrition, with approximately 30% of all
Bangladeshis and 56% of all Bangladeshi children under the age of
five suffering from moderate to severe malnutrition.59 In 2006,
Danone developed an enriched yogurt with essential nutrients
(Grameen Danone) that could be delivered at a price point well below
Danone's traditional model. 60 Grameen Danone is run as a joint
venture between Danone and the Bangladeshi government. 6 1 Since
developing the product, Danone has decided not to focus on Grameen
Danone as a profit-making venture. 62 Instead, Danone has taken the
know-how it developed in creating the enriched yogurt product for the
Bangladeshi market and applied it to a new line of yogurt products,
Activia, which it now markets in the United States and other
markets. 63 Danone executives have repeatedly noted that, but for their
focus on developing a yogurt that helped solve Bangladesh's
malnutrition crisis, they probably would never have developed the
know-how that then allowed them to develop Activia. Activia has
allowed Danone to broaden their yogurt offerings and market
164potential.
57 Id.; HINDUSTAN UNILEVER LIMITED, ANNUAL REPORT 2012-13: MAKING
SUSTAINABLE LIVING COMMONPLACE 14 (2013), http://www.hul.co.in/Images/HUL
_AnnualReport_2012-13_tcmi 14-289694.pdf, UNILEVER, PROGRESS REPORT 2012:
UNILEVER SUSTAINABLE LIVING PLAN 7 (2013), http://www.unilever.co.uk/Images
/USLP-Progress-Report-2012-Fl_tcm28-352007.pdf.
58 See Danone at a Glance, DANONE, http://www.danone.com/en/for-all/mission
-strategy/danone-at-a-glance/ (last visited Oct. 17, 2015).
59 Grameen Danone Foods Ltd., GRAMEEN CREATIVE LAB, http://www.grameen
creativelab.com/live-examples/grameen-danone-foods-ltd.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2015);
see also U.N. FOOD & AGRIC. ORG., FAO-NUTRITION COUNTRY PROFILES:
BANGLADESH 3-4 (1999), ftp://ftp.fao.org/es/esn/nutrition/ncp/BGDmap.pdf.
60 Grameen Danone Foods Ltd., supra note 59.
61 Grameen Danone Foods Ltd: The Project's History, DANONE COMMUNITIES,
http://www.danonecommunities.com/en/project/grameen-danone-food?mode=history (last
visited Oct. 17, 2015).
62 Id.
63 See DANNON ACTIVIA, http://activia.us.com (last visited Oct. 17, 2015); Barbara
Kiviat, Danone's Cheap Trick, TIME (Aug. 23, 2010), http://content.time.com/time
/magazine/article/0,9171,2010077,00.html.
64 See Kiviat, supra note 63.
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In addition to these examples, there are several other stories of
intrapreneurial behavior occurring at different corporations in a
65
variety of industries. While the collected stories of intrapreneurial
activity are too extensive to be individually described in detail, the
Appendix provides a snapshot of the extent and multi-dimensionality
of social-intrapreneurial endeavors.
The examples set forth in Appendix demonstrate the breadth of
behavior associated with the social intrapreneur. Although social-
intrapreneurial practices are diverse both in terms of the industry of
the host corporations and the intrapreneurial products, services, or
solutions they devise, six key commonalities emerge. First, social
intrapreneurship is in large part a voluntary undertaking that requires
either the implicit or explicit agreement on the part of the host
66corporation in order for it to be successful. Second, social
intrapreneurship is a private ordering intra-corporate activity that
takes place in the absence of regulation or other legal directive. Third,
social intrapreneurs are adept at seeing the relationship between the
67corporation's potential and the extra-corporation needs of society.
Fourth, and related to the third, social intrapreneurs are able to "code
switch." 68 In other words, they are able to move between a business
mindset and a focus on societal needs, part of which includes being
able to make the "business case" for a social product or service that
may not obviously contribute to the financial bottom line.69 Fifth,
social intrapreneurs are adept at seeing new ways of redeploying and
coordinating corporate resources to achieve tripartite
dimensionality-social, moral, and financial.7° And sixth, social
intrapreneurs do not seem to view profit as their sole maximand.
Rather, their strength is in creating new opportunities that inure to the
benefit of both the corporation and society, and being able to
articulate the business case for their initiatives. 7' Put differently,
considerations of profit are a necessary part of the analysis for many
intrapreneurial initiatives, yet such considerations are not looked at in
isolation or as a maximand; rather, they are viewed in tandem with
the social need that the initiative seeks to address. For example, in a
65 See infra Appendix.
66 See SUSTAINABILITY, supra note 1, at 5.
67 See id.
68 See id. at 30.
69 See id.
70 See Ashoka, supra note 6; SUSTAINABILITY, supra note 1, at 27, 30.
71 See SUSTAINABILITY, supra note 1, at 13.
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recent interview, Aspen First Movers Fellow and Director of
Corporate Strategy Development at Dow Chemical, Dawn Baker,
stated that to justify social intrapreneurship to shareholders, it is
important to start with the company's vision and show how an
72innovative project will fulfill that vision. In other words,
corporations should present intrapreneurial innovations to
shareholders not solely in terms of profit, but also by demonstrating
how these innovations will benefit the corporation's corporate
purpose and/or goals.
In spite of its touted value, however, social intrapreneurship
presents concerns that should give one pause. First, one should
consider the all that glitters is not gold problem-meaning that, as
described above, there are certain activities that outwardly manifest as
social-intrapreneurial-like but inwardly are really driven by profit,
thus falling into the category of activities dismissively labeled as
green washing. This concern will arise any time an initiative presents
a strong business case. Second, is the concern that because some
intrapreneurs work on their initiatives off the clock, there is an
increased risk of inefficient resource use or, in the extreme,
misappropriation of the corporation's resources by the employee-
intrapreneur. Third, are concerns related to the increased
identification and monitoring costs that are incurred by the
corporation when managing intrapreneurial initiatives.
Many of the social intrapreneurs interviewed for the Field Guide
Report acknowledged the opposing arguments against
intrapreneurship. Common reported responses from opponents
included, "[w]e're not in that business," "[w]e'll be seen to be
greenwashing," and "[t]his is a distraction." 73 Part V returns to these
concerns and considers potential contractual, doctrinal, and
organizational solutions that help alleviate these concerns.
Nonetheless, in spite of the various concerns about social
intrapreneurship, The Economist, in an article reviewing a book on
social intrapreneurs, posited that intrapreneurs rather than
entrepreneurs were arguably the greatest change agents for
developing innovative and sustainable products, services, and
72 Aspen at Roosevelt House-Social Intrapreneurship: Keeping Your Day Job and
Finding Meaning in Your Work, ROOSEVELT HOUSE (Mar. 11, 2014), http://www
.roosevelthouse.hunter.cuny.edu/events/aspen-roosevelt-house-social-intrapraneurship/.
73 SUSTA1NABILITY, supra note 1, at 43.
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solutions for the market place.74 In a separate article, The Economist
noted:
The greatest agents for sustainable change are unlikely to be [social
entrepreneurs], interesting though they are. They are much more
likely to be the entirely reasonable people, often working for large
companies, who see ways to create better products or reach new
markets, and have the resources to do so.
7 5
Additionally, Sir Richard Branson, author and founder of Virgin
Group, summed up the value of intrapreneurs as follows:
Many millions of people proudly claim the title "entrepreneur." On
the other hand, a title that hasn't gotten nearly the amount of
attention it deserves is entrepreneur's little brother, "intrapreneur"
.... While it's true that every company needs an entrepreneur to
get it under way, healthy growth requires a smattering of
intrapreneurs who drive new projects and explore new and
unexpected directions for business development.
76
In sum, while social intrapreneurship presents some legal
concerns,77 their value is in their ability to reimagine the bounds and
limits of their host corporation's activities. This reimagination, which
successfully links directives of profit with other-regarding behavior,
arguably offers an innovative way for a corporation to negotiate
corporate law's structural socio-profit divide.
II
THE SOCIO-PROFIT DIVIDE: UNDERSTANDING THE NEED FOR GAP-
FILLING
In 2014, the United States Supreme Court, in Burwell v. Hobby
Lobby Stores, Inc., stated that "[a] corporation is simply a form of
organization used by human beings to achieve desired ends." 78 Those
"desired ends" need not be homogeneous and in practice may differ
from one corporation to the next. As one might expect, the scope and
nature of these desired ends-or as one might say "purpose" or
"mission"-may very well be determined by a range of factors. These
factors include the corporation's business model, the will of its
74 Unreasonable People Power, ECONOMIST (Jan. 22, 2008), http://www.economist
.com/node/%2010555875.
75 Social Entrepreneurs: Agents of Change, supra note 7.
76 Richard Branson, Richard Branson on Intrapreneurs, ENTREPRENEURS (Jan. 31,
2011), http://www.entrepreneur.com/article/218011.
77 See infra Part IV.
78 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2768 (2014).
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shareholders, law, industry norms and best practices, management's
internal moral compass, historical events, and external societal
pressures.
However, despite the positive fact that, in practice, corporations
seem to take a "let a thousand flowers bloom" approach to their
articulated purpose, as a normative matter, the question of what
should be the proper purpose of corporations continues to engage the
corporate law academy. There are two primary approaches to the
purpose of a corporation: one, to maximize shareholder wealth-
called the "property view" or "shareholder primacy view"-and the
other, as having a "broader social purpose that [goes] beyond making
money for their shareholders." 79 Another category that should be
inserted into this debate, but traditionally has not been, are those who
believe there does not have to be a choice, that successful
corporations can do both.
This Article does not seek to resolve the debate. Rather, the
remainder of Part II attempts to trace the contours of the debate and to
succinctly summarize key factors that have contributed to the
trajectory and shape of the debate, with an eye on understanding the
main points of contention.
A. The Origins
While one could certainly have a mini-debate about where to begin
an attempt to describe the history of corporations and, relatedly,
discussions about their purpose, this Article takes the seventeenth
century as its starting point, primarily because it was a period that saw
the growth in the corporate form. In the 1600s, as countries like
England, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain tried to expand the
reach of their empires and establish trade with the new world,
corporate forms were established and granted powers by the state to
execute these trading missions.8 1 These initial corporations were
viewed as "bodies politic" that existed "on sufferance of the Crown,"
which in turn had reserved the right to revoke or revise the
corporation's issued charter and which required regular charter
82renewal. As noted jurist and thinker, Sir William Blackstone,
79 LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH 16 (2012).
80 See David Ciepley, Beyond Public and Private: Toward a Political Theory of the
Corporation, 107 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 139, 139 (2013). In the seventeenth century, the
corporations were often referred to as "body corporates." Id.
81 Id.
82 Id.
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observed at the time, corporations were essentially "little
republic[s].' 83
Prior to the nineteenth century, corporations were viewed as quasi-
public entities that owed their existence and rights to the chartering
state. 84 However, at some point in the nineteenth century, and
continuing on into the early 1900s, corporations began to be
conceptualized through a distinctly private-purpose lens.85 One
explanation for this change relates to the triumph of liberalism over
mercantilism in broader political thought, which resulted in
corporations being viewed as private concerns drawn up through
private contract.86 David Ciepley, a political science professor whose
work focuses on the history of corporations, summarized the
connection as such:
One of the signal projects of nineteenth-century American
liberalism was to sharpen the distinction between public and private
and divide the social world between them. Business corporations
were placed on the private side of this divide, assimilated -to
liberalism as private partnerships and, in some contexts, even as
private persons. Corporate power that was once unaccountable
because of state regulatory weakness now became unaccountable as
a point of legal doctrine, as corporations came to be viewed ever
more thoroughly through the lens of private contract.
87
In the 1930s, the Harvard Law Review published a highly charged
dispute between Professors Adolf Berle and Merrick Dodd. Professor
Berle adopted the shareholder primacy view, arguing that "all powers
granted to a corporation or to the management of a corporation...
[are] at all times exercisable only for the ratable benefit of all the
83 1 WILLIAM BLACKS'tONE, COMMENTARIES *468 ("But when they are then
consolidated and united into a corporation, they and their successors are then considered as
one person in law: as one person, they have one will, which is collected from the sense of
the majority of the individuals: this one will may establish rules and orders for the
regulation of the whole, which are a sort of municipal laws of this little republic; or rules
and statutes may be prescribed to it at its creation, which are then in the place of natural
laws .... ); see also Ciepley, supra note 80, at 141.
84 David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201, 205-06 (1990).
85 See Allen, supra note 14, at 266 & n. 13.
86 See id. at 280.
87 Ciepley, supra note 80, at 139 (citations omitted). As an aside, Ciepley's point that
corporations "came to be viewed ever more thoroughly through the lens of private
contract" can be seen in the nexus of contract theoretical strand in the corporate law
literature. Nexus of contract theorists view the corporation as an interconnected web of
contracts that reflect privately negotiated terms and where the regulatory role of the state
should be kept to a minimum. See infra Part V.B. for a general discussion of the web of
contract theory and, specifically, its application to social intrapreneurship.
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shareholders . *.. ,,88 Professor Dodd staunchly disagreed. s 9 He
argued that "the business corporation [is] an economic institution
which has a social service as well as a profit-making function ..... "90
Thus, as Professor Stout writes, for Dodd, "the proper purpose of a
public company went beyond making money for shareholders and
included providing secure jobs for employees, quality products for
consumers, and contributions to the broader society. '9 I Dodd's view
of the public corporation as an entity chartered by the state "for public
benefit and run by professional managers seeking to serve not only
shareholders but also 'stakeholders'," held considerable sway in the
first half of the twentieth century. Ironically, in 1954 Berle conceded
the debate, stating that: "[t]he argument has been settled (at least for
the time being) squarely in favor of Professor Dodd's contention."
92
However, starting in the 1970s, shareholder primacy thinking
began to regain its footing, with economists arguing that the proper
purpose of corporate governance was to maximize shareholder
wealth. An oft-cited example, which was influential in establishing
shareholder primacy as a dominant paradigm, was an article by
Nobel-prize winning economist Milton Friedman, in which he argued
that given that shareholders "own" the corporation, increasing profits
should be the only responsibility of business.
9 3
This idea of shareholders as owners is the core of a seminal piece
by Michael Jensen, where he described the shareholders as the
principals of the corporation and the board of directors as their
agents. 94 Thus, he argued, the only legitimate purpose of the
corporation was to maximize shareholder wealth.
9 5
88 A.A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049, 1049
(1931). In 1932, Professor Berle also articulated these views in a book he had coauthored
with Gardiner Means. See generally ADOLF A. BERNE & GARDINAR MEANS, THE
MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932).
89 See E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV.
L. REV. 1145, 1147-48 (1932).
90 id. at 1148.
91 STOUT, supra note 79, at 17.
92 ADOLF A. BERLE, JR., THE 20TH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION 169 (1954).
93 Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits,
N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 13, 1970, at 33.
94 See generally MICHAEL C. JENSEN, A THEORY OF THE FIRM: GOVERNANCE,
RESIDUAL CLAIMS, AND ORGANIZATIONAL FORMS (2003).
95 Id.
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B. Shareholder Primacy
Shareholder primacy has a built-in package of rules, principles, and
terminology that makes it efficient and attractive to academia, the
popular press, and business media alike. The notion of having an
objective maximand (i.e., maximize shareholder wealth) with an
objective means of measurement (the stock market and the attendant
efficient market hypothesis) and a tightly worded framing of the
problem, proved and continues to prove attractive to many.96 The
shareholder primacy view and its attendant solutions, such as
increased shareholder rights and enhanced control and monitoring of
boards, pervade and shape the corporate law landscape. For example,
the shareholder primacy view is embedded in corporate law
curriculum and is often presented to law students as the default
framework for thinking about corporate governance and corporate
purpose. Shareholder primacy thinking has also influenced significant
changes and developments in corporate law, such as changes to the
shareholder proxy voting rules in 1992 that made it easier for
shareholders to embattle incumbent boards. 97 In addition, the
shareholder primacy view is reflected in the tax code, most apparent
in the 1993 amendments to the U.S. tax code that sought to encourage
companies to tie executive pay to stock price and other objective
performance metrics. 98 It can also be found in the case law, most
notably in the case of Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., where the court
stated that "a business corporation is organized and carried on
primarily for the profit of the stockholders."
9
Strands of shareholder primacy thinking are also reflected in the
Cadbury Report (which notes that boards are accountable to
shareholders because the board acts as stewards on behalf of the
shareholders),' °0 which in turn formed the basis for the OECD
96 See Tamara C. Belinfanti, Forget Roger Rabbit-Is Corporate Purpose Being
Framed?, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 675 (2013-14) (discussing the implications of framing
theory on the corporate purpose debate).
97 See 17 C.F.R. 240.14a (2015).
98 See 26 U.S.C. § 162(m); Jay Lorsch, The Pay Problem, HARV. MAG., May-June
2010, http:/Iharvardmagazine.com/2010/05/the-pay-problem.
99 Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919).
100 See COMM. ON THE FIN. ASPECTS OF CORP. GOVERNANCE, REPORT OF THE
COMMITTEE ON THE FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 6.6 (1992),
http://www.icaew.com/-/media/corporate/files/library/subjects/corporate%20govemance
/financial%20aspects%20of/020corporate%20govemance.ashx.
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Principles of Corporate Governance.101  However, the OECD
Principles do not adopt a strong shareholder primacy view in that they
recognize that one of the goals of corporate governance should be to
design systems that encourage boards and managers to make
decisions that benefit the long-term interests of the corporation and its
shareholders. 102
Finally, the shareholder primacy framework abounds in legal
literature. As Professor Jeffrey Gordon observed, "[b]y the end of the
1990s, the triumph of the shareholder value criterion was nearly
complete."' 0 3 However, perhaps no clearer indication of shareholder
primacy's "triumph" exists than an article entitled The End of History
for Corporate Law, wherein Professors Kraakman and Hansmann
asserted that "the triumph of the shareholder-oriented model of the
corporation over its principal competitors is now assured .. ,4
Professors Kraakman and Hansmann declared that:
[A]cademic, business, and governmental elites in leading
jurisdictions [all agreed] . . . that ultimate control over the
corporation should rest with the shareholder class; the managers of
the corporation should be charged with the obligation to manage the
corporation in the interests of its shareholders; other corporate
constituencies, such as creditors, employees, suppliers, and
customers, should have their interests protected by contractual and
regulatory means rather thaf through participation in corporate105
governance ....
C. The Longstanding Counterpoint and Recent Shift
Not to beat the proverbial dead horse, but despite the asserted
triumph of shareholder primacy, there is a long-standing unease in the
corporate law literature with how to square profit maxims with
notions of social value creation. As others have noted, one view is
that corporate law does not require that corporations relentlessly
maximize shareholder value, except in the limited instance when the
corporation has entered "Revlon mode," which occurs when the
101 See generally ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., OECD PRINCIPLES OF
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (2004), http://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/corporategovemance
principles/31557724.pdf.
102 Id. at 60.
103 Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 1950-
2005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465, 1530
(2007).
104 Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89
GEO. L.J. 439, 468 (2001).
105 Id. at 440-41.
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corporation is for sale. 1° 6 Four sources of corporate law are helpful
for explicating this point: state corporate and constituency statutes;
the use of organic documents; the business judgment rule (BJR); and
state case law. Thus, for starters, state corporate statutes do not
require a specific purpose of profit maximization. The Delaware
General Corporate Law (DGCL), for example, provides that "[a]
corporation may be incorporated or organized under this chapter to
conduct or promote any lawful business or purposes .... 07
Similarly, the Pennsylvania Business Corporations Act provides that
"every business corporation has as its corporate purpose the engaging
in lawful business for which corporations may be incorporated under
the BCL."1 °8 In fact, a majority of states have constituency statutes
that explicitly allow the corporation to consider stakeholders other
than shareholders. 1
09
Second, it is interesting to note that if a corporation chooses to
define its purpose as being to maximize shareholder wealth, it could
do so by indicating as such in its organic documents. However,
according to Professor Lynn Stout, "[t]he typical corporate charter
defines the corporate purpose as anything 'lawful."" 10 Third, the BJR
leaves the board with discretion to determine the best course of action
for the company so long as they are acting in good faith in the best
interest of the company. 1 Fourth, similar to the OECD Principles,
case law generally describes directors' duties as being owed to both
the corporation and the shareholders.' 12 Moreover, several of the
takeover cases provide an interesting counterpoint to the shareholder
primacy paradigm. In the case of Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum
Co., the Supreme Court of Delaware stated that in considering the
merits of a business transaction, the directors could consider the
106 See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del.
1986) (holding that when the sale of a corporation becomes inevitable, the board of
directors' duties changes from preserving the corporate entity to maximizing the
company's value in the sale for the shareholders' benefits).
107 DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 101(b) (2014).
108 19 PA. CODE § 23.4(b) (2013).
109 Jessica Chu, Filling a Nonexistent Gap: Benefit Corporations and the Myth of
Shareholder Wealth Maximization, 22 S. CAL. INTERDIsC. L.J. 155, 172 (2013) ("For the
. . . states that have not adopted constituency statutes, state corporate laws neither
expressly permit directors to consider the interests of stakeholders nor explicitly require
directors to consider only corporations and shareholders.").
I 0 Lynn A. Stout, Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford, 3 VA. L. & BUS. REV.
163, 169 (2008).
11 See Smith v. Van Gorkorn, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985).
112 Id.
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"impact on 'constituencies' other than shareholders .... ,113 The
court even went so far as to enumerate in parenthetical whom they
had in mind, stating "(i.e., creditors, customers, employees, and
perhaps even the community generally)."' 1
4
Leading corporate law scholars such as Professor Einer Elhauge
and Professor Lynn Stout, have questioned the validity and utility of
shareholder primacy when applied to the large public corporation.'' 5
Far from conceding the "triumph" of shareholder primacy over the
social institution view, in a 1992 Cardozo Law Review article, former
Chancellor Allen described the duality and bifurcation between
axioms of profit and those of social interest that pervade corporate
law and practice. 16 The former Chancellor wrote:
Two inconsistent conceptions have dominated our thinking about
corporations since the evolution of the large integrated business
corporation in the late nineteenth century. . . . In the first
conception, the corporation is seen as the private property of its
stockholder-owners [and] [t]he corporation's purpose is to advance
the purposes of these owners (predominantly to increase their
wealth).... The second conception sees the corporation not as the
private property of stockholders, but as a social institution.
According to this view, the corporation is not strictly private; it is
tinged with a public purpose. 1t7
Similarly, in a 2005 article published in the New York University
Law Review, Professor Elhauge discussed the conceptual divide that
has traditionally existed in the canonical corporate law account
between concepts of profit and those of social good." 8 Elhauge noted
that the canonical account views social and moral considerations as
best dealt with outside of corporate law, and thus, according to the
canonical account, corporate law should focus on aligning the
interests of managers and shareholders to maximize shareholder
profit. 119
113 Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985).
"14 Id.
115 See generally Allen, supra note 14; Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in
the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733 (2005); Lynn A. Stout, Bad and Not-So-Bad
Arguments for Shareholder Primacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1189 (2002); Leo E. Strine, Jr.,
The Social Responsibility of Boards of Directors and Stockholders in Change of Control
Transactions: Is There Any "'There " There?, 75 S. CAL. L. REv. 1169 (2002).
116 See generally Allen, supra note 14.
117 Id. at 264-65.
118 Elhauge, supra note 115, at 776-818.
119 See id.
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The most recent installment in the debate can be found in a
forthcoming essay by Delaware Supreme Court Chief Justice Leo E.
Strine, Jr. In his forthcoming essay, the Chief Justice reaffirms the
existing structural divide between profit and social axioms and argues
that "directors must make stockholder welfare their sole end, and that
other interests may be taken into consideration only as a means of
promoting stockholder welfare."' 20 In sum, the gap between profit
and social axioms remains a fundamental feature of American
corporate law. Yet today many for-profit corporations face pressure
from various stakeholders including investors, consumers, and
prospective employees to bridge this structural gap created by
corporate law.
D. Bridging the Gap
But how can one bridge this noted divide? In a post-2008 world,
the solutions on the table have been both internal and external. In
terms of the former, large pockets of attention have been dedicated to
CSR and sustainability initiatives on the part of large corporations,
and other internal programs that have a social aspect. These include
impact investing, community relations, corporate philanthropy, or
working towards innovative models (like Whole Foods CEO John
Mackey's "conscious capitalism" or Harvard Business School
professor Michael Porter's "creating shared value"). 121  Part I
provided an overview of these internal CSR solutions and programs.
The balance of Part II.D considers external solutions that focus on
creating alternative business forms.
First, is the low-profit limited liability company (or L3C).
Generally, L3Cs are modified LLCs that make it simpler for a
company with a social purpose to gain investments by way of loans,
grants, and charitable foundations.' 2 2 State L3C legislation generally
alters an existing LLC statute and allows the L3C to receive Program
120 Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Danger of Denial: The Need for a Clear-Eyed Understanding
of the Power and Accountability Structure Established by the Delaware General
Corporation Law, WAKE FOREST L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 10)
(http://ssm.com/abstract=2576389).
121 See generally MACKEY & SISODIA, supra note 10; Porter & Kramer, supra note 10.
122 Malika Zouhali-Worrall, For L3C Companies, Profit Isn't the Point, CNN: MONEY
(Feb. 9, 2010, 10:49 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2010/02/08/smallbusiness/13clow
_profit-companies/.
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Related Investments (PRIs) from private foundations.1 2 3 An L3C's
articles of incorporation must typically state the entity's primary
charitable or educational purpose, or that the entity does not have a
significant purpose to produce income or appreciate property. 124 The
L3C's benefits include the legal and tax flexibility of traditional
LLCs, the "social good" approach of nonprofits, and the publicS125
relations benefits of a social enterprise. However, their success
largely depends on the effectiveness of proposed IRS regulations to
reduce the tax risks associated with PRIs. 126 The future of the L3C,
"the most widely criticized social enterprise entity,"' 27 may even be
in jeopardy. In January 2014, North Carolina abolished its L3C
legislation, finding that "[they are] not necessary" and that the
traditional LLC could be used for most of its purposes.128
Less controversial than the L3C are the flexible purpose
corporations (FPCs) and social purpose corporations (SPCs).
California established the first FPC state statute in 2011; however, the
California legislature amended its FPC statute and renamed such
entities "Social Purpose Corporations."' 2 9  As in California,
Washington and Texas have statutes for the organization of SPCs. 3 °
123 Robert T. Esposito, The Social Enterprise Revolution in Corporate Law: A Primer
on Emerging Corporate Entities in Europe and the United States and the Case for the
Benefit Corporation, 4 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 639, 682 (2013).
124 Id. at 683.
125 Marc J. Lane, Social Enterprises: A New Business Form Driving Social Change, 16
ABA YOUNG LAWYER, Dec. 2011, http://www.americanbar.org/publications/young
_lawyer/201 1-12/december_2011/socialenterprisesnew.business form-driving-social
_change.html.
126 Esposito, supra note 123, at 706.
127 Id. at 688.
128 Anne Field, North Carolina Officially Abolishes the L3C, FORBES (Jan. 11, 2014,
11:17 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/annefield/2014/01/l/north-carolina-officially
-abolishes-the-13c/.
129 Steven R. Chiodini, Goodbye Flexible Purpose Corporation, Hello Social Purpose
Corporation, LAWFORCHANGE, http://www.lawforchange.org/NewsBot.asp?MODE
=VIEW&ID=6384 (last visited Oct. 18, 2015). Effective January 1, 2015, previously
organized FPCs in California became SPCs, but they need not amend their article of
incorporation. Id.
130 Corp. Laws Comm., ABA Bus. Law Section, Benefit Corporation White Paper, 68
BUS. LAW. 1083, 1088-89 (Aug. 2013). Under the Washington statute, "the articles of
incorporation of a social purpose corporation may, but need not, contain a provision
Irequiring the corporation's directors or officers to consider the impacts of any corporate
action or proposed corporate action upon one or more of the social purposes of the
corporation."' Id. In Texas, its legislature amended its Business Organizations Code
allowing "for-profit corporations to include one or more social purposes in their
certificates of formation, and it set forth a list of acceptable social purposes identical to the
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Like FPCs, an SPC's articles of incorporation must provide a
corporate purpose statement and must be organized to promote or
minimize short-term or long-term effects of the corporation's
activities upon: (1) its employees, suppliers, or customers; (2) the
local, state, national, or world community; and/or (3) the
•131
environment. Unlike the FPC statute, "charitable purposes" is
absent. Additionally, under the California and Washington statutes,
directors may but are not required to consider its enumerated purpose
as a factor in making decisions, although the Washington statute
allows SPCs to include a provision that requires directors to consider
such impacts. 133 As with FPCs, directors of SPCs enjoy limited
liability and are shielded from actions for failure to maximize
shareholder value. 134 This "distinctly anti-Revlon, anti-shareholder
wealth maximization mission" makes SPCs an appealing
alternative.' 35 However, SPCs and FPCs share similar drawbacks: the
lack of a third-party standard in reporting promotes a lack of
accountability and forces investors to rely on unregulated
assessments. 136
.. 137
A final alternative business form is the benefit corporation. At
the time this Article was submitted for publication, thirty-one states
have passed legislation on benefit corporations.' 38 B Lab, the
'specific public benefit' list offered by B Lab as a model for benefit corporation states." Id.
at 1089.
131 Esposito, supra note 123, at 692-93.
132 Id. at 693.
133 Benefit Corporation White Paper, supra note 130, at 1088-89.
134 Esposito, supra note 123, at 693-94.
135 Id. at 694 (italicization added).
136 Id.
137 Note the distinction between a "B Corporation" and a benefit corporation: B Lab
certifies existing corporations that wish to brand themselves as "B Corporations," while
benefit corporations are corporate entities authorized under state corporate law. Id. at 695.
To become a B Lab-certified "B Corporation," B Lab requires that the corporation conduct
an impact assessment, submit required documents, adopt B Lab's amendments to its
articles of incorporation, complete a disclosure questionnaire, pay a certification fee, and
agree to randomized on-site reviews. See Performance Requirements, BENEFIT CORP.,
http://www.bcorporation.net/become-a-b-corp/how-to-become-a-b-corp/performance
-requirements (last visited Oct. 18, 2015).
138 State by State Status of Legislation, BENEFIT CORP., http://benefitcorp.net/policy
makers/state-by-state-status (last visited Oct. 18, 2015). Not all legislation is uniform; for
instance, Hawaii's benefit corporations are known as "sustainable business corporations"
and Maryland's legislation includes both benefit corporations and benefit limited liability
companies (or BLLCs). See CARTER G. BISHOP, SUFFOLK UNIV. LAW SCH., LEGAL
STUDIES RESEARCH PAPER 10-11, FIFTY STATE SERIES: L3C & B CORPORATION
LEGISLATION TABLE (2014).
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organization that pioneered the benefit corporation,' 39 reports that
over 1,400 registered benefit corporations exist.1 40 Overall, benefit
corporation statute sections include general provisions, corporate
purpose, accountability, and transparency.' 4 1 Every statute requires
the corporation's articles of incorporation to state that it has the
purpose of creating a general public benefit and allows them to
specify one or more special public benefits. 142 For accountability, in
addition to the traditional shareholder-profit duty, benefit corporation
directors have a duty to consider the effects of business decisions on
stakeholder groups or constituencies.' 43 A unique part of benefit-
corporation legislation is the third-party standard requirement,
ensuring proper transparency of its performance assessment.'
4 4
Many praise the benefit corporation form- for providing an
organizational form that allows companies to "do good" while still
making a profit.' 45 In addition, others have noted the appeal that
benefit corporations have to Millennials, who comprise nearly 50% of
the global workforce, demand a "work-life integration," and want to
bring their "whole selves" to work. 146 Delaware Supreme Court Chief
Justice Strine praised benefit corporations for putting "some actual
power behind the idea that" a corporation can operate for the best
interest of both its stockholders and its constituencies.' 4 7 However,
the benefit corporation is not without criticism. For many, they
• 148
present questions: Will companies "doing good" also generate
long-term returns? How will the public markets price them when they
first go public? Can they honor their commitment if sold to larger
139 Esposito, supra note 123, at 695.
140 Find a Benefit Corp, BENEFIT CORP., http://benefitcorp.netbusinesses/find-a
-benefit-corp (last visited Oct. 18, 2015) (B Lab's search results also indicate whether the
company is a certified "B Corporation" by B Lab).
141 Esposito, supra note 123, at 697.
142 Id.
143 Id. at 699.
144 Id. at 700-01.
145 Gilbert et al., supra note 12. According to B Lab's co-founders, benefit corporations
benefit (1) policy makers and the public interest by combatting "short termism"; (2)
business leaders by attracting the best talent; (3) customers by providing greater
transparency; (4) employees by promising higher-quality jobs; and (5) investors by
mitigating risks and accelerating the growth of market opportunities that meet the needs of
investors who want to "do good" while still making a profit.
146 Id.
147 Leo E. Strine, Jr., Making it Easier for Directors to "Do the Right Thing"?, 4
HARV. Bus. L. REV. 235, 242 (2014).
148 See id. at 251-53.
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companies? Additionally, the greater reporting requirements may
deter many businesses due to the high transaction costs and the
ambiguity of the third-party standard assessment. 149 The final, but
arguably most powerful, critique of the benefit corporation' 5 0 is the
harmful "good" versus "bad" dichotomy they create.' 51 Specifically,
the promotion of the benefit corporation fosters the erroneous
understanding that the law compels traditional for-profit corporations
to single-mindedly maximize profits and only under alternative
business forms can it consider a range of interests to make responsible
business decisions. 152
While these various models that seek to provide a business form
for meshing profit and social interest have gained popularity both at
the legislative level and in practice, a closer look at these 'models
reveals their limits. Namely, these models involve potentially high
transaction costs. These transaction costs include information
gathering costs; the cost of initial set-up; ongoing compliance with
extra layers of formalities (such as any attendant certification
process); and the uncertainty that attends a wholesale opt-out of a
known structure (in this case, the traditional for-profit corporation)
and a wholesale opt-in to a relatively new and untested legal structure.
In sum, initiatives for bridging the socio-profit gap fall roughly into
four different camps. The first is internal corporate programs like
CSR, sustainability initiatives, or corporate philanthropy
endeavors.15 3 The second camp includes those proposals that seek to
shift the focus of inquiry from encouraging the corporation to behave
"responsibly" to encouraging shareholders-namely institutional
investors-to behave more responsibly. The third is the creation of
alternative statutory business forms, such as benefit corporations,
L3Cs, flexible purpose corporations, and social purpose corporations,
which explicitly allow corporations to pursue both profit and social
149 See Doug Bend & Alex King, Why Consider a Benefit Corporation?, FORBES (May
30, 2014, 9:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/theyec/2014/05/30/why-consider-a
-benefit-corporation/.
150 This critique is arguably applicable to all of the above mentioned alternative
business forms.
151 Mark A. Underberg, Benefit Corporations vs. "Regular" Corporations: A Harmful
Dichotomy, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (May 13, 2012),
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2012/05/13/benefit-corporations-vs-regular-corpora
tions-a-harm ful-dichotomy/.
152 Id.
153 See supra Part 1.
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interest. And the final camp includes the use of externality regulations
such as environmental laws or human rights laws.
Thus far, social intrapreneurship has been noticeably absent from
legal academic discourse on matters related to socio-profit divisions.
Yet social intrapreneurship offers a compelling model to corporations
interested in integrating their social potential with their profit
objectives. As Luis Sota, an intrapreneur at CEMEX, noted: "Social
intrapreneurs create the prophecies that allow companies to make new
business offerings. At the same time, they are reenvisioning the terms
in which corporations engage society."
1 54
III
SOCIAL INTRAPRENEURSHIP AS A BRIDGE?
Luis Sota's idea of "reenvisioning" and actually recreating "the
terms [on] which corporations engage society" provides both a
figurative and conceptual segue to understanding the importance of
intrapreneurship as a gap-filling device. 155 The need for gap-filling
exists because, in the corporate landscape, there has been a long-
standing divide between notions of being for-profit and being socially
beneficial. 156 Based on the range of social intrapreneurial initiatives
analyzed for this Article, social intrapreneurship can be
conceptualized as bridging three related but distinct sets of gaps.
First, is the "stockholder-to-stakeholder" bridge that results from
intrapreneurial endeavors that create a connection between
shareholder maximand concepts and the interests of other
stakeholders who are involved with and/or affected by the
corporation's activity. Second, is a "shareholder-to-shareholder"
bridge that gets created between so-called impact investors or socially
responsible shareholders on one hand and purely financially
motivated shareholders on the other. The third and final bridge can be
conceptualized as a "meta-bridge" between canonical schisms of
profit and social interest. Social-intrapreneurs often attempt to create
reimagined relationships between their host corporation and society.
As re-imagined, the corporation's activities are no longer construed as
bound by profit, but instead they are bound by their potential to be a
resilient and viable corporation in a more interconnected world.
154 SUSTAINABILITY, supra note 1, at 43.
155 Id.
156 See supra Part 11.
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A. Stockholder-to-Stakeholder Bridge
One effect of the tension that exists in the canonical account
between profit-seeking and social-purpose endeavors is that, because
the board is viewed primarily as an agent of the shareholders, non-
shareholders or other stakeholders in the corporation are accorded a
subsidiary status in our existing account. In practice, however,
directors and management must navigate between all aspects of the
corporation's business and often times do consider the impact of their
decisions along financial and non-financial dimensions. This is not to
say that managers and directors seek to subordinate the interests of
stockholders to those of other firm patrons, but rather that they are
often called upon to balance these various interests as part of their
decision-making. Social intrapreneurship has utility in this regard.
Thus, returning to the aforementioned case study of Luis Sota's
initiative at CEMEX, with Patrimonio Hoy-which roughly translates
to "Patrimony Today" or "Savings/Property Today"' 7 Sota
identified the external social problem as the lack of affordable
housing for low-income families in Mexico. Sota's proposed solution
was a business model that allowed CEMEX to create building
material options for low-income builders, which in turn allowed these
builders to provide low-income families with access to home
ownership.' Instead of proposing that CEMEX donate houses or
building materials to address low-income housing needs (i.e., engage
in pure philanthropy) or create a CSR program where CEMEX would
donate some portion of revenue to address these needs each time a
consumer purchased a CEMEX product, Sota developed a model that
directly enhanced the company's financial, as well as its social,
bottom line.
Perhaps much of the success of the program has to do with Sota's
ability to code-switch between the logic of the local communities in
Mexico that CEMEX sought to reach and the business logic of
CEMEX's business model and operations. Sota spotted the gap
between these external societal needs and the business opportunity for
CEMEX. Initially, CEMEX was flummoxed as to how to adapt its
' - 59
existing strategies and assets to service these communities. As a
result, CEMEX did something unprecedented. It issued a "Declaration
157 Ajit Sharma, CEMEX: Innovation in Housing for the Poor, MICH. BUS. SCH., Dec.
12, 2003, at 2; SUSTAINABILITY, supra note 1, at 39.
158 See SUSTAINABILITY, supra note 1, at 39.
159 See id.
2015]
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of Ignorance" in which it publicly announced that it had identified
deficiencies in its product offerings, that it had no idea how to correct
these deficiencies, and that it was willing to disregard its traditional
approaches to business in order to find a solution.'60
This bold new approach did not at first receive widespread internal
support, but senior management understood Sota's vision and they
forged ahead.' 6 1 CEMEX then undertook a unique anthropological
survey of these local communities, which studied the
autoconstruccion or "do-it-yourself' model of building in low-income
communities and sought to identify patterns of building techniques
and market dynamics. 16 As a result of this research, key findings
emerged that allowed Sota to better see how to reconfigure CEMEX's
approach and value chain in a way that was mutually beneficial to the
company and low-income communities.1 63 For example, the research
revealed that the building process in targeted communities was
characterized by a start-and-top pattern, which often resulted from
lack of capital to complete construction and/or because of shoddy
builders, contractors, or engineers who would not see a project
through to completion.164 Armed with this information, Sota was then
able to retool CEMEX's approach to both products and markets, in
addition to its value chain. CEMEX launched Patrimonio Hoy in
1999, which is essentially a membership program for low-income
customers, whereby customers apply in groups of three to become
members. Membership requires a minimum hour of labor
commitment, in addition to which they pay a weekly membership fee.
In return, CEMEX provides a "package" for construction, which
includes not only the building materials, but also an architect,
. 165
engineer, and contractor.
Patrimonio Hoy presents a prime example of how an
intrapreneurial initiative could serve a gap-filling function between
stockholder interests and the interests of other constituents. The
160 See Shared Value Initiative, Patrimonio Hoy: Access to Housing and Finance,
CEMEX 1, http://sharedvalue.org/sites/default/files/resource-files/CemexSVlCase_06-08
-15.pdf(last visited Oct. 18, 2015).
161 Id.
162 Id.
163 SUSTAINABILITY, supra note 1, at 39.
164 See id; Treasure at the Bottom of the Pyramid, Bus. TODAY (Dec. 11, 2011),
http://businesstoday.intoday.in/story/innovation-cemex/l/20184.htnl.
165 See High Impact Social Programs, CEMEX, http://www.cemex.com/Sustainabe
Development/HighlmpactSocialPrograms.aspx (last visited Oct. 18, 2015); Shared Value
Initiative, supra note 160; SUSTAINABILITY, supra note 1, at 39.
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success of Patrimonio Hoy lies in its ability to connect the internal
competencies of the corporation with the external social needs of the
low-income housing market. The connection of internal competencies
to external needs arguably benefits CEMEX's shareholders as any
increase in revenue and profits bodes well for their returns. Similarly,
other constituents of CEMEX are able to reap tangible social
benefits-the most direct being to members of Patrimonio Hoy who
stand to gain a home.
In addition to creating a link between stockholder welfare and the
welfare of other specific firm patrons like consumers, some social
intrapreneurial endeavors rely on pan-sector partnerships. Examples
include Coca-Cola's water sustainability program (designed to
address problems of water scarcity) or Danone's Danone-Grameen
collaboration (designed to address childhood malnutrition), both of
which involve pan-sector collaboration across business, state and civil
society. In the case of Danone-Grameen,166 the Bangladeshi
governmeit and civil society organizations had identified and
attempted to address-by their own admissions, unsuccessfully-the
problem of childhood malnutrition.167 Danone was able to apply its
know-how and resources on yogurt manufacturing to create and
deliver a product that was both appealing to children and effective in
helping to alleviate some of the deficiencies in their diets. 68 Without
the expertise of its civil society partners and the collaboration with the
Bangladeshi government, Danone would not have had the same type
of access to understanding of community norms and potential hiccups
that prior social programs had faced. Similarly, the Bangladeshi
government and the civil society organizations did not have the
expertise or know-how to develop a product to address the
malnutrition need. Social intrapreneur Muhammad Yunus identified
the need and also identified the prospect of connecting Danone's
business potential to the need and expertise of the Bangladeshi
166 See supra Part 1.
167 See Bangladesh: Children and Women Suffer Severe Malnutrition, IRIN (Dhaka)
(Nov. 19, 2008), http://www.irinnews.org/report/81544/bangladesh-children-and-women
-suffer-severe-malnutrition.
168 See Grameen Danone Foods Ltd., DANONE CMTY., http://www.danonecommunities
.com/en/project/grameen-danone-food?mode=history (last visited Oct. 18, 2015); Asad
Ghalib et al., Social Responsibility, Business Strategy and Development: The Case of
Grameen-Danone Foods Limited, 3 AUSTL. ACCT., BUS. & FIN. J. 1, 7-8 (2009), http.//ro
.uow.edu.auL/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article= 1061 &context-aabfj.
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government and its NGO partners.' 69 Through Danone-Grameen,
Yunus created an interconnected bridge of all three sectors, or in the
words of Muhtar Kent, CEO of Coca-Cola, Inc., he provided the
vision for drawing a "Golden Triangle" (i.e., a three-pronged
connection between business, government, and civil society). 170
The social intrapreneurial initiatives presented in this Part illustrate
the role of social intrapreneurship as gap-filler between stockholder
welfare and the welfare of other firm patrons and/or society. The
initiatives examined attempt to construct a link between stockholder
welfare and the welfare of others. Social intrapreneurial models are
often not about reinforcing a subservient relationship between profit
and social value creation, in either direction, but rather they attempt to
reimagine the relationship as one of simultaneity rather than as being
sequential in nature. Put differently, social intrapreneurship is not
about flouting stockholder value; rather it is very much about
achieving stockholder value by creating social value.
B. Shareholder-Shareholder Bridge
For most publicly traded corporations, there is no single type of
shareholder. As described in the 2014 article, Shareholder Cultivation
and New Governance, share ownership is highly heterogeneous with
different types of shareholders who have a dizzying array of
investment behaviors, motives, agendas, internal pressures, and
expectations. 171 This heterogeneity creates "for corporations and their
boards," what noted practitioner Ira Millstein termed a "'zoo' of
owners with different stripes, teeth, sensors, claws, vision, strength,
will, and attitudes."' 172 Thus, for example, shareholders differ as to
whether they are natural beings; some shareholders are individuals,
although most shareholders of record are large institutional
shareholders. They also differ by the length of their investment
169 James Melik, Danone 's Yogurt Strategy for Bangladesh, BBC NEWS (July 8, 2009,
7:05 PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/8100183.stm.
170 Muhtar Kent, Opinion, The Golden Triangle-Spearheading Change the Smart Way,
COCA-COLA (Nov. 7, 2012), http://www.coca-colacompany.com/stories/opinion-the
-golden-triangle-spearheading-change-the-smart-way#TCCC.
171 See generally Belinfanti, supra note 1 (discussing the diverse array of shareholder
preferences in terms of investment horizon and objective).
172 Ira M. Millstein, Senior Assoc. Dean for Corp. Governance, Yale Sch. of Mgmt.,
Lecture at Charkham Memorial, London, Eng.: Directors and Boards Amidst Shareholders
with Conflicting Values: The Impact of the New Capital Markets (July 9, 2008) (transcript
available at https://www.frc.org.uk/FRC-Documents/FRC/Professor-lra-M-Millstein
-Lecture.aspx).
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horizon (short-term, long-term, or somewhere in between) and their
objectives for investing in the company. Some shareholders are what
Warren Buffett terms "owner-partners," meaning that these are
shareholders who understand the company's operations, attitudes, and
expectations and who are less likely to sell their shares, or as Buffett
terms it, "wiggle[] around daily.., when some economic or political
event makes [them] nervous." 173  On the other hand, some
shareholders fall into what Professor Brian Bushee terms "transient"
investors who exhibit a high rate of turnover and move in and out of a
company's stock. 174 Others are so-called "dedicated" shareholders
who attempt, or whose objective is, to advance their own views of
some aspect of corporate governance and/or business operations or
strategy on the board and management, as well as on the other
shareholders. 75 In addition, a relatively new type of shareholder has
emerged: that of the so-called "high-frequency trader" or "high-speed
trader." High-frequency traders use a fully automated trading system
to "read" the trades of others and to move in and out of securities at a
rapid speed, often just in milliseconds, and often reaping a handsome
profit at the expense of the trades that they leaped over. 176 As one
would expect, shareholders who fall under the "high frequency
trader" umbrella have minimal interest in understanding the business
of the companies behind the shares (i.e., they are the antithesis of
Buffett's "owner-partner" shareholder). 177
Still yet, shareholders differ on how they view the connection
between a corporation's profit-seeking activities and its undertaking
of socially beneficial activities. For shareholders who fall under the
"impact investor" or "socially responsible" investor banner, socially
beneficial activities on the part of the company are part of their
criteria and objective for investing their capital in the corporation. On
the other hand, shareholders who embrace the pure profit-maximand
173 See WARREN E. BUFFETT, AN OWNER'S MANUAL (1996) (a booklet issued to
Berkshire Hathaway, Inc.'s Class A and Class B shareholders to explain the company's
"broad principles of operation").
174 Brian Bushee, Identifying and Attracting the "Right" Investors: Evidence on the
Behavior of Institutional Investors, 16 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 28, 29 (2004).
175 Id.
176 See Tamara Belinfanti, Insider Trading 2.0 - Keeping Up With The Super Computer
Arms Race, BUS. L. PROF. BLOG (Mar. 19, 2014), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com
/business law/2014/03/insider-trading-20-keeping-up-with-the-super-computer-arms-race
.html.
177 See, e.g., James Sterngold & Jenny Strasburg, For SAC, a Shift in Investing Strategy
Later Led to Suspicions, WALL ST. J. (July 24, 2013, 6:40 PM), http://www.wsj.com
/articles/SB10001424127887324144304578622300959537068.
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norm are focused on financial returns, and a focus on the social side is
either nonexistent or minimal.
Continuing Millstein's zoo analogy, unlike a true zoo, where
everyone recognizes that different animals are indeed different (e.g., it
would be unwise to feed the conures the same food that is meant for
the lions), corporate law is yet to fully embrace the realities of
shareholder heterogeneity. Responses to this heterogeneity have
mainly been private-ordering in nature. Trends such as proxy-access
bylaws, which limit eligible shareholders by amount of share
ownership and length of share ownership, is an example of this type
of private ordering, as well as various shareholder cultivation
techniques used by corporations to identify potential "owner-partner"
shareholders. 17
8
Social intrapreneurship fits into these private-ordering activities
because it is very much a practice that is privately negotiated and
facilitated without explicit legal mandate.' 79 Moreover, the social-
intrapreneurial focus on connecting profit imperatives to social needs
potentially helps to soften the divide between various shareholder
interests. For example, impact investors or socially responsible
investors, 'as well as shareholders who fall closer to the profit-
maximand end of the spectrum, could all get behind initiatives like
Patrimonio Hoy at CEMEX or Microsoft's Unlimited Potential Group
initiative. The latter offers affordable technology to low-income
segments of the population, which has allowed Microsoft to expand
its reach into emerging markets.' 
80
C. The Meta-Bridge? Socio-to-Profit?
As illustrated throughout this Article, many social-intrapreneurial
initiatives attempt to gap-fill between concepts of profit and social
interest, and, in fact, it is this bridging between profit and social value
creation that is at the heart of their success. Notably, Patrimonio Hoy
has lived up to CEMEX's financial and business goals, as well as
178 See, e.g., Belinfanti, supra note 11, at 811; Paul Hodgson, At Whole Foods,
Chipotle, and Others, Shareholders Prepare for Battle, FORTUNE (Feb. 3, 2015, 1:00 PM),
http://fortune.com/2015/02/03 /whole-foods-chipotle-proxy-access/ (providing examples
from Whole Foods and Chipotle, where the corporations present their own proxy-access
resolutions).
179 See generally Robert W. Hillman, The Bargain in the Firm: Partnership Law,
Corporate Law, and Private Ordering Within Closely-Held Business Associations, 2005
U. ILL. L. REV. 171, 173 (2005).
180 See infra Appendix.
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social goals, with the company convinced the project has increased
revenues and market shares, and improved the corporate image.'
81
Simultaneously, Patrimonio Hoy has provided homes for eight
hundred thousand families in Mexico and, because of its success, the
program has been replicated in Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and the
Dominican Republic. 182 Similarly, Unilever's initiative provides
another case in point. On the internal-business side of the equation,
Unilever estimates that it expanded its market and revenue as a result
of the Shakti initiative.' s3 Simultaneously, on the social side, the
Shakti program has trained approximately seventy thousand women
entrepreneurs who in turn distribute to four million households that
were previously unable to access Unilever products. 184 Also, consider
Accenture's Accenture Development Partnership (ADP), which
resulted from an intrapreneurial initiative and which links Accenture's
core consultancy with its ADP model to create new brokering
functions that reach new clients and partnerships.
Establishing socio-profit connectivity through these various
intrapreneurial initiatives leads to interesting normative as well as
doctrinal questions. On the normative front, the more companies
engage in this type of socio-profit bridging, the more the canonical
corporate law account will be forced to wrestle with the question of
whether pure profit maximization is the best norm for assessing
corporate activity and for designing corporate governance rules. Of
course, one obvious hedge to this question is to expand the definition
of "profit maximization" to include value-enhancing initiatives such
as these. Relatedly, in terms of doctrinal concerns, socio-profit
bridging that allows for simultaneous instead of sequential positive
contributions to both the financial bottom line and the social bottom
line will arguably limit the need for the existing temporal divide in
corporate law doctrine between the "short-term" and the "long-term."
This temporal divide is seen in Shlensky v. Wrigley,185 which
involved a derivative suit over a business decision by the owners of
181 SUSTAINABILITY, supra note 1, at 39; CEMEX, 2012 ANNUAL REPORT 19 (2012),
http://www.cemex.com/1nvestorCenter/files/2012/CemexAnnual Report2012.pdf; TED
LONDON, MICH. Ross SCH. OF BUS., CEMEX'S PATRIMONIO HOY: AT THE TIPPING
POINT? 8 (2012).
182 SUSTAINABILITY, supra note 1, at 39.
183 Emily Mello, Celebrate Solutions: Micro-Entrepreneurship as a Tool for Women's
Empowerment, WOMEN DELIVER (Jan. 19, 2015), http://www.womendeliver.org/updates
/entry/celebrate-solutions-micro-entrepreneurship-as-a-tool-for-wmens-empwerment.
184 Id.
185 Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776 (111. App. Ct. 1968).
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the Cubs baseball team not to hold "night games. ' 86 The board's
articulated reason for deciding not to hold night games was that it
would have a deleterious effect on the surrounding neighborhood.
1 87
The shareholder-plaintiff attempted to argue that such a rationale was
invalid because the board was not allowed to make decisions that
would sacrifice the corporation's profit.'s8 The Shlensky court drew a
distinction between short-term interests and long-term interests. The
Court opined that in the former, non-profit-seeking initiatives would
be permitted within the confines of the business judgment rule, but
that in the long-term, the board would have to demonstrate that their
undertakings would inure to the financial bottom line.' 89 This
temporal divide articulated in Shlensky is a stable feature of corporate
law jurisprudence and, as then-Chancellor Allen noted, it provides "a
serviceable, [but potentially] intellectually problematic way, for the
corporation law to avoid choosing between the alpha of property and
the omega of relationships."' 90
Successful social intrapreneurship arguably lessens the problem
because, instead of accepting the status quo of choosing "between the
alpha of property and the omega of relationships," it dismantles the
choice and seeks to forge a more complementary socio-profit
relationship.
IV
POTENTIAL LEGAL CONCERNS
The existence of social intrapreneurship within a corporation raises
interesting questions of transparency, accountability, monitoring, and
the allocation of intellectual property rights.' 9 1 Although social
intrapreneurship does not fall under any one express law or legal
mandate, social intrapreneurship as a practice does overlay and/or
intersect with the corporate law framework in several ways. In
addition to the legal rules and theories analyzed above in Part III, this
Part considers other points of intersection.
186 Id. at 777-78.
187 Id. at 778.
188 Id.
189 See id. at 779-80.
190 Allen, supra note 14, at 273.
191 Additionally, concerns about strategic bargaining, incentive structures, and tax
consequences are also present in the context of social intrapreneurship.
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A. Business Judgment Rule and Social Intrapreneurship
The business judgment rule in corporate law is a long-standing,
judge-made principle that provides a shield from liability for directors
in making business decisions when the rule applies. In Aronson v.
Lewis, the Supreme Court of Delaware articulated the rule as follows:
The business judgment rule is an acknowledgment of the
managerial prerogatives of [] directors under [the Delaware General
Corporate Law]. It is a presumption that in making a business
decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis,
in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the
best interests of the company. Absent an abuse of discretion, that
judgment will be respected by the courts. The burden is on the party
challenging the decision to establish facts rebutting the
presumption. 192
Thus, should a host corporation's board of directors make a
business decision to allow for the implementation and/or execution of
social-intrapreneurial initiatives, absent a showing of fraud, illegality,
"waste," or bad faith, this decision by the host corporation's board
will enjoy deferential protection under the BJR. 193
B. Monitoring Devices-Fiduciary Duty of Oversight and Contractual
Mechanisms
Second, even if a board does not make an affirmative business
decision to permit social intrapreneurship activities (either specific
ones or in general), the board would still need to comply with what
are short-handedly referred to as its Caremark duties. In In re
Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation, the Chancery
Court of Delaware held that a board has a duty of oversight and that
this duty of oversight required that the board establish "information
and reporting systems ... that are reasonably designed to provide to
senior management and to the board itself timely, accurate
information sufficient to allow management and the board, each
within its scope, to reach informed judgments concerning both the
corporation's compliance with law and its business performance." 1
9 4
The Chancery Court noted that in order to prove a breach of
Caremark duties:
192 Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. Super. Ct. 1984) (citations omitted).
193 See id. at 812 n.6.
194 In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation, 698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del. Ch.
1996).
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plaintiffs would have to show either (1) that the directors knew or
(2) should have known that violations of law were occurring and, in
either event, (3) that the directors took no steps in a good faith effort
to prevent or remedy that situation, and (4) that such failure
proximately resulted in the losses complained of. ...
The Caremark standard applies to legal risks; thus, it would apply
should any intrapreneurial activity cause the host corporation to
violate the law.196 In terms of intrapreneurial activities that do not
result in a violation of law, the case of In re Citigroup Inc.
Shareholder Derivative Litigation is instructive.
19 7
In Citigroup, the plaintiff alleged that the Citigroup directors had
breached their duty of oversight by failing to monitor the business
risks, which ultimately led to Citigroup suffering billions of losses in
the wake of the subprime mortgage crisis. 19s The Citigroup court
drew a distinction between matters of legal risk and matters of
business risk. The Court noted that the latter falls squarely within the
business judgment of the board and, a priori, "the core protections of
the business judgment rule";1 99 thus the presumption could only be
rebutted by showing gross negligence or bad faith. Additionally,
the court noted that "the mere fact that a company takes on business
risk and suffers losses-even catastrophic losses-does not evidence
misconduct, and without more, is not a basis for personal director
liability." 20 1 The implication of Caremark and Citigroup on social-
intrapreneurial initiatives is that, while they provide core legal
boundaries for intrapreneurial endeavors, they simultaneously allow
broad latitude for a corporation to facilitate intrapreneurship practices
within the bounds of the fiduciary duty of care.
For activities that are not illegal but nonetheless potentially
troublesome (e.g., spending inordinate amounts of the workday
daydreaming about solving some social problem rather than attending
to the tasks at hand), as well as for illegal activities, such situations
can be dealt with ex ante in the employee's contract. This method
serves as a private-ordering means of establishing a governance
mechanism ex ante for problems that could occur expost.
195 Id. at 971.
196 See id. at 967.
197 In re Citigroup Inc. Shareholder Derivative Litigation, 964 A.2d 106 (Del. Ch.
2009).
198 Id. at 111.
199 Id. at 125.
200 Id. at 124, 128.
201 Id. at 130.
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On this last point, intrapreneurial contractual devices could draw
on contractual mechanisms employed by universities for research
employees or used by corporations for employees who develop and/or
have knowledge of the company's intellectual property design. For
starters, social-intrapreneurial innovation typically builds upon
existing inventions or, in the alternative, establishes "novel and
radical ideas."20 2
Under the traditional setup in the innovation space, an employee-
inventor owns the patent rights to an invention even if the invention
was "conceived and/or reduced to practice while the inventor was
203
employed" by the corporation. However, corporations often ensure
asset lock-in by requiring employees to enter into contracts that
expressly vest ownership over such inventions in the corporation-
employer.204 This type of contractual arrangement could be easily
replicated in the intrapreneurial space.
Additionally, several strategies used in the broader innovation
space for incentivizing and rewarding innovation could be adopted
and tailored to social-intrapreneurial initiatives. Potential strategies
that could be used to incentivize, retain, and/or reward social
intrapreneurs include financial rewards (e.g., raises, bonuses, and
promotions), management-endorsed discretion to alter the
corporation's culture, substantial autonomy, and proper allocation of
resources for developing innovations.
2 05
202 Shannon H. Hedvat, A New Age of Pro-Employer Rights: Are Automatic
Assignments the Standard?, 13 U. PA. J. Bus. L. 817, 822-23 (2011); see also Wuryan
Andayani et al., Corporate Social Responsibility, Good Corporate Governance and the
Intellectual Property: An External Strategy of the Management to Increase the Company 's
Value, NAT'L CONF. ON MGMT. RES. 2008 (Nov. 27, 2008) ("In the intellectual capital,
there are intellectual properties which include the income from the patent right, the amount
of the patents, and the registered design, the value of copyright, the expenditure of R & D,
house mark, and brand survey. The company which does the R & D, improves its
information technology, introduces a plan, house mark, and creates a new thing to be
patented, will obviously improve its way of work, and have the contribution to the
shareholders, the owners of interests, employees, business partners, and the society.
Therefore, it is expected that the company which has the intellectual property can improve
the way of work of the company.").
203 Paul C. Van Slyke & Mark M. Friedman, Employer's Rights to Inventions and
Patents of Its Officers, Directors and Employees, 18 AIPLA Q.J. 127, 132 (1990).
204 Id.
205 See Larry Myler, Intrapreneurs Are Just Like Entrepreneurs.. NOT!, FORBES (Jan.
15, 2014, 12:11 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/larrymyler/2014/01/15/intrapreneurs
-are-just-like-entrepreneurs-not/.
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C. The Efficient Market Hypothesis and Social Intrapreneurship
A third point of interest in terms of legal implications is the ability
of the market and stockholders to monitor and discipline wayward
social-intrapreneurial practices. The disciplining of wayward social-
intrapreneurial practices is analogous to the disciplining of any
internal activity of the corporation. Under the efficient capital market
hypothesis (ECMH), markets are deemed to be efficient, meaning that
they reflect all available information about the given corporation in
the stock price. 20 6 Investors can react to this information by buying or
selling. This trading by investors serves as a disciplinary tool, because
a sale of the company's stock would reflect a disapproval or lack of
207
confidence in the corporation's business.
Applying the ECMH framework, the argument would be that if a
given corporation's social-intrapreneurship facilitation began to eat
into or affect the corporation's value, as reflected in its stock price,
the market will react by trading out of that corporation's stock, thus
exerting discipline on management. Of course, there are two flies in
the ointment. First, there are problems with the ECMH, as the stock
price does not always do a good job of reflecting necessary
information, and thus reliance on ECMH may be overstated. Second,
even if ECMH were to work perfectly, is social intrapreneurship
always visible? Meaning, because it involves the voluntary work of
insiders, and it is work that is not necessarily part of their core
mandate, there is a reasonable probability that, for at least some
period of time, these activities will remain hidden from the market. In
addition, however, to the use of stock price as a disciplinary tool,
other standard disciplinary tools, such as the potential for managerial
ouster and the market for takeovers, also still exist as a means of
market discipline of wayward social intrapreneurship.
D. Disclosure Rules and Social Intrapreneurship
A fourth poit-that connects to the third-is the role that
disclosure can play in both keeping the corporation honest and in
informing the market, thereby enhancing the shareholders' ability to
206 See generally Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market
Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549 (1984); Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory
of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN.
ECON. 305 (1976).
207 See generally Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 206; Jensen & Meckling, supra note
206. But see Stout, supra note 110.
2015] Contemplating the Gap-Filling Role of Social Intrapreneurship III
monitor and make decisions. Currently, social-intrapreneurial
endeavors are not explicitly required to be disclosed under the United
States securities rules and the regulations by the United States
Securities Exchange Commission (SEC). However, should a social-
intrapreneurial initiative evolve to the point where it becomes
formalized and becomes a significant revenue earner, disclosure could
be required under United States securities laws.205 Similarly, should
the initiative be formalized as a separate business segment under
Regulation S-K, the company would be required to report and provide,. , 209
necessary disclosures. Also, although not formally required in the
United States, companies who voluntarily issue social responsibility
reports or "integrated reports" can take the opportunity to disclose
successful social-intrapreneurial initiatives therein.
2 10
E. Shareholder Proposals and Social Intrapreneurship
A fifth and admittedly more forward-looking connection is the role
of social intrapreneurship within the Rule 14a-8 shareholder proposal
framework. Under Rule 14a-8 of the United States Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934 (as amended), shareholders who meet certain
requirements are entitled to have their proposals included in a
corporation's proxy statement for its annual meeting, unless the
proposal falls under one of the rule's thirteen substantive grounds forS• 212
exclusion. One of the thirteen substantive grounds for exclusion is
if the proposal relates to "ordinary business." 21 3 A review of the case
law and SEC action in this area illustrates that courts and the SEC
often draw a distinction between proposals involving business matters
and those that raise issues of public policy. For example, in the case
of Medical Committee for Human Rights v. SEC, the D.C. Circuit
held that the Dow Chemical Company could not omit a shareholder
208 See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77 (2012); Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
15 U.S.C. § 78 (2012); Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2012).
209 17 C.F.R. § 229.101(c)(1)(i) (2015) (requiring disclosure for each business segment
"for each of the last three fiscal years the amount or percentage of total revenue
contributed by any class of similar products or services which accounted for 10 percent or
more of consolidated revenue in any of the last three fiscal years or 15 percent or more of
consolidated revenue, if total revenue did not exceed $50,000,000 during any of such
fiscal years.").
210 See generally Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, J.
POL. ECON. 110 (1965).
211 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2015).
212 See id. at § 240.14a-8(f)(1).
213 See id. at § 240.14a-8(i)(7).
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proposal related to Dow's production of napalm. The proposal
requested that the Dow board adopt an amendment to the company's
certificate of incorporation to bar the sale of napalm to any buyer
214unless the buyer was able to provide certain assurances. The court
noted that "there [was] a clear and compelling distinction between
management's legitimate need for freedom to apply its expertise in
matters of day-to-day business judgment, and management's patently
illegitimate claim of power to treat modem corporations with their
vast resources as personal satrapies implementing personal political or
.. ,,215
moral predilections. The court further noted that "[i]t could
scarcely be argued that management is more qualified or more
entitled to make these kinds of decisions than the shareholders
,,216
Similarly, in a 1976 Interpretive Release addressing the Medical
Committee decision, the SEC noted that there was a distinction
between proposals that involve ordinary business operations and thosethatinvove ... .. 217
that involve significant policy implications. According to the SEC,
"proposals of that nature" (i.e., those that have significant social or
moral implications) while at one time "excludable," could not be
excluded because such proposals were "beyond the realm of an
issuer's ordinary business operations."
2 18
The use of the shareholder proposal mechanism to garner attention
for social and environmental matters has a long history. If support for
corporate sustainability as an ideal continues to grow, one would
expect that shareholder proposals involving social and environmental
issues would also continue to maintain a presence in the annual
corporate voting season. The presence of successful social-
intrapreneurial initiatives within a corporation's operations could
arguably head off some of these proposals, or conversely, social or
environmental concerns raised by shareholder proposals could serve
214 432 F.2d 659, 680-81 (D.C. Cir. 1970), vacated by SEC v. Med. Comm. for Human
Rights, 404 U.S. 403 (1972). But see Cracker Barrel Old Country Stores, Inc., SEC Staff
No-Action Letter (Sept. 20, 1994), 1994 WL 511459 (allowing exclusion of proposal
regarding Cracker Barrel's discrimination policies).
215 Med. Comm. for Human Rights, 432 F.2d at 681.
216 Id.
217 Adoption of Amendments Relating to Proposals by Security Holders, Exchange Act
Release No. 34-12,999 (Nov. 22, 1976) [hereinafter SEC Release No. 34-12,999]; see also
Keir D. Gumbs & Elizabeth A. lsing, The Shareholder Proposal Process, in A PRACTICAL
GUIDE TO SEC PROXY AND COMPENSATION RULES § 12.04 (Amy L. Goodman et al. eds.,
5th ed., 2014).
218 SEC Release No. 34-12,999, supra note 217.
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as a spark for an intrapreneurial initiative. Put differently,
intrapreneurship may provide a manageable and practical way for a
corporation to address reasonable concerns that are expressed through
the shareholder proposal mechanism.
V
THEORIES OF THE CORPORATION AND SOCIAL INTRAPRENEURSHIP
No account of social intrapreneurship through a corporate law lens
would be complete without contemplating how the practice of social
intrapreneurship would be interpreted under various theories on the
nature of corporations. Not surprisingly, because corporations are not
homogeneous in terms of patterns of ownership, distribution of rights,
internal governance structures, and business strategy-to name a
few-several theories on the nature of the corporation exist. Thus, the
corporation qua institution has been described in various ways,
including (1) as a legal entity; (2) as a web of contracts; (3) as an
aggregate of people; (4) as the property of its shareholders; (5) as a
team of people; and (6) as a political choice. 2 19
With respect to social intrapreneurship, the nexus of contract
theory, the property theory, and the team-production theory are
particularly salient because they attempt to deal with the complexities
of internal corporate affairs and competing interests. The balance of
this Part contemplates the narrative of intrapreneurship under each of
. . .. 220
the theoretical frames of contract, property, and team production.
A. Web of Contracts Theory
Web of contract theorists view the corporation as a web or "nexus"
of both implicit and explicit contracts among the state, the corporation
and its shareholders, employees, and customers. 221 All are voluntarily
219 See JEFFREY D. BAUMAN & RUSSELL B. STEVENSON, CORPORATIONS LAW AND
POLICY 17--49 (West eds., 8th ed. 2013); LYNN STOUT, CORPORATE ENTITIES: THEIR
OWNERSHIP, CONTROL, AND PURPOSE ch. B.VII.3 (forthcoming) (manuscript at 10) (on
file with author).
220 For each theoretical frame of contract, property, and team production, this Article
has deliberately limited the description of each theory to the position taken by proponents
and has not attempted to capture the range of drawbacks and concerns that agitators of
each have noted. This choice is mainly driven by concerns of argument efficiency, as well
as the realization that the general concerns voiced by agitators inherently wend their way
into the discussion as they manifest as limitations of the specific theory in explaining
intrapreneurship.
221 STOUT, supra note 219 (manuscript at 15).
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222
engaged in the corporate enterprise. For example, in The Economic
Structure of Corporate Law, Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel
posited that "corporate law has an economic structure, [which]
increases the wealth of all by supplying the rules that investors would
select if it were easy to contract more fully." 223 Similarly, in The
Contractual Theory of the Corporation, Professor Henry Butler
argued that "the corporation [is] founded in private contract, where
the role of the state is limited to enforcing contracts."'22 4 The
influence of the contract theorist approach can also be seen in court
opinions. For example, in 2010, the Supreme Court of Delaware in
Airgas, Inc. v. Air Products and Chemicals, Inc. referred to the
corporate bylaws as "contracts among a corporation's
shareholders. 2 2 5
Under this theory, freedom of contract permits the parties to
structure their relationships as they choose. A related strand of the
theory advances the idea that corporate law itself is contractual in
nature because it supplies a package or "standard form" of terms,
which in many instances, can be negotiated or "contracted around" to
produce the optimal contractual arrangement for the particular
.. 226
corporation. Finally, the web-of-contract literature posits that
because corporations must compete for investors' capital, they will
design governance structures to reduce the risk of management
• 227
overreaching so as to attract investment.
Thus, under a nexus of contracts view, social-intrapreneurial
endeavors could be conceptualized as constituting yet another implicit
or explicit-depending on the level of formality and endorsement
exhibited by the host corporation-contractual arrangement between
the intrapreneur and the host corporation. In terms of the metaphor of
corporate law as providing a standard form contract, 228 one can
conceptualize profit-maximand principles as functioning as a
(mandatory?) default term and, relatedly, social intrapreneurship as a
contracting practice that provides an alternative means of achieving
222 Id.
223 FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW, at vii (1991).
224 Henry N. Butler, The Contractual Theory of the Corporation, 11 GEO. MASON U. L.
REV. 99, 100 (1989).
225 Airgas, Inc. v. Air Prods. and Chems., Inc., 8 A.3d 1182, 1188 (Del. 2010).
226 See Butler, supra note 224, at 119-20 (1989); BAUMAN & STEVENSON, supra note
219.
227 BAUMAN & STEVENSON, supra note 219, at 602.
228 See supra Part II.
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this default. Finally, as shall be discussed below, the web-of-contract
framework is helpful in designing mechanisms for addressing
traditional contract problems that occur within the intrapreneurial
space, which include problems of shirking, relationship breakdown,
and contract unwinding.
One limitation of attempting to understand intrapreneurship from
the prism of web-of-contracts, is that many web-of-contract theorists
"dismiss the corporate entity as irrelevant or even nonexistent."
229
This is problematic for a fulsome account of intrapreneurship because
successful intrapreneurship depends on the active involvement of the
corporation itself; not simply as an intangible series of contracts, but
as a tangible form that has the wherewithal to apply its know-how to
address a social problem.
B. Property Theory
Under property theory of the corporation, shareholders are deemed
to be the "owners" of the corporation; the corporation "belong[s]" to
the shareholders, and thus the directors and officers are best
, - • , ,,230
conceptualized as being "agents" of the shareholder "principals.
By extension, property theorists hold that in carrying out their duties
as agents of the shareholders, management must be guided by an
objective of maximizing shareholder value.2 3 1 The moment in time at
which one measures this value, or the means of how best to measure
the value, is the subject of contentious debate. However, drawing on
the short-term/long-term bridge, as well as the shareholder-
shareholder and shareholder-stakeholder bridges described above, the
intrapreneurial narrative under a property theorists view could be
constructed as follows: successful intrapreneurial initiatives positively
contribute to the corporation's financial bottom line, thus increasing
the shareholder's return on equity. Moreover, shareholders maintain a
monitoring role vis-A-vis management and are thus in a position to
discipline management either through "exit" or "voice" for failed
initiatives.
232
The limit of property theory in explaining the presence of
intrapreneurship is that for a property theory purist social
intrapreneurship could in many ways be viewed as the antithesis of
229 STOUT, supra note 219 (manuscript at 16).
230 Id. (manuscript at 13).
231 See supra Part II.
232 ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY (1970).
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the theory's premise. Property theory views shareholders as the
principals for whose benefit the corporation should be run, while
social intrapreneurs by the nature of their work are employing the
corporation's resources to address the needs of stakeholders and
shareholders. One response to this limitation would be to say that
social intrapreneurship practices inure to stockholder welfare, and
thus they can be viewed as fulfilling the objective of serving the best
interest of shareholders. Furthermore, an argument could be made
under the property-theorist view that best interest of shareholders by
necessity contemplates meeting the external needs of external
stakeholders in a manner that benefits the corporation's financial
bottom line or at a minimum does not negatively impact the
corporation's financial value beyond some reasonable amount.
C. Team Production Theory
The team production theory of the corporation "focuses on the role
corporate entities play in fostering team production, meaning
production that requires contributions from more than one party."
233
According to Professors Blair and Stout, who were the first to espouse
this theory:
Essential corporate team members (shareholders, employees, and
others who make company-specific investments) give up property
rights over the team's joint output to the corporate entity, which
"owns" any surplus generated by team production. The corporate
entity in turn is governed by a board of directors whose members
cannot keep the surplus for themselves but must choose between
keeping the surplus in the entity's name or distributing all or part of
it to various corporate team members (for example, paying
dividends to shareholders or larger salaries to employees). If the
board's members want to keep the corporate entity viable so as to
keep their board positions, they have incentive to use corporate
surplus to reward various team members as necessary to keep those
members inside the corporate team.
2 34
Therefore, according to the team production theory, "corporate
directors [are] not [viewed] as agents of shareholders, but as a
governance mechanism designed to encourage and protect specific
investment in corporate team production."
' 235
233 STOUT, supra note 219 (manuscript at 17) (citing Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A.
Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247 (1999)).
234 Id. (manuscript at 17-18).
235 Id. (manuscript at 18).
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Under this theory, social intrapreneurs would thus be
conceptualized as "team members" whose input or contribution to the
team include not only what they were initially hired to do but also the
voluntary intrapreneurial activities that they are now engaged in. For
corporations that have a formalized intrapreneurial process or who are
beginning to specifically recruit team members to contribute their
intrapreneurial talents, the same result holds. Moreover, any surplus
that results from intrapreneurial activities would become part of the
corporation's surplus, and the use of this surplus would fall under the
discretion of the board as "mediating hierarch." 236 Under the team
production model, the board is incentivized to partition the surplus to
reward corporate team members because this is necessary to minimize
members "quitting" the team.
Team production theory appears to capture the essence of social-
intrapreneurial practice; although, one potential limitation of the
theory is that it does not explicitly address how one would deal with a
wayward intrapreneurial team member. Thus, one could imagine a
scenario where a team has a member who is an intrapreneur, but who
deliberately keeps his or her intrapreneurial activities hidden from the
rest of the team. In the extreme, one could further imagine that these
hidden activities are actually to the detriment of joint production.
While team production theory does not explicitly address this
scenario, one default that team production does provide for dealing
with these types of scenarios is to refer to the mediating-hierarch
function of the board. Hence, it would be the board, on a case-by-case
basis, who would decide how best to handle actions by team members
that detract from the overall contributions of the team.
.Social intrapreneurship presents various points of intersect with
corporate law theory, doctrine, statutory rules, and general principles.
An examination of social intrapreneurship through a corporate law
frame reveals that the conceptual divide between profit and social
good need not be as sharp as currently portrayed.
IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
Social intrapreneurs occupy a unique space within for-profit
corporations at the intersection of innovation, profit, and social good.
The hallmark of their work is in identifying a target problem, often
social in nature, and reconceptualizing the use of corporate resources
in a manner that inures to the full complement of the proverbial triple
236 See generally Blair & Stout, supra note 233.
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bottom line. While being close relatives of social entrepreneurs and
their corporate sustainability counterparts, social intrapreneurs differ
in one important respect: solving social needs are not part of their
mandate. Rather, they voluntarily opt to make social need their
business. While this distinction is potentially beginning to fade the
more corporations recognize the value of social intrapreneurship and
the more formalized intrapreneurship becomes, the intrapreneurial
initiatives studied in this Article all shared this core characteristic of
volunteerism at the outset.
While social intrapreneurship is not without its limitations, such as
problems of shirking, increased monitoring costs on the part of the
host corporation, or problems of identification, governance, and
monitoring, incentive structures can be designed to address these
concerns. In addition, the presence of corporate law fiduciary duties,
the threat of product or market discipline, and the threat of managerial
ouster, all serve as potential disciplinary mechanisms against
inefficient intrapreneurialism.
Social intrapreneurship offers potential gap-filling benefits for
today's corporations. It presents a compelling new imaginary that
reconceptualizes and expands the boundaries of corporate activity in a
manner that interweaves concerns of profit and social interest.
Furthermore, social intrapreneurship arguably has significant policy
implications. First, it offers a model for traditional C-corporations to
compete with newer business forms, such as benefit corporations or
social purpose corporations, which have been explicitly created to
address the profit-public interest divide. Second, social
intrapreneurship is a means for keeping socially conscious employees
in the corporate sector rather than crowding them out. Third, social
intrapreneurship provides a more organic, advanced, and arguably
more sustainable approach to the profit-public interest divide than
CSR initiatives or other corporate philanthropic endeavors. Fourth,
and perhaps most important for this Article, is that social
intrapreneurs help corporations navigate the axiomatic divide between
profit and public interest. This latter point has implications for the
broader policy discussions that are occurring primarily outside of law:
on the unaddressed needs and untapped potential of nonconventional
markets, the so-called "bottom of the pyramid," and the advantages of
trisector (state/private/nonprofit) coordination.
To be clear, this Article does not make a normative claim that
profit and social interest should be aligned. Nor that stockholder
welfare should be subsumed to the interests of others. And nor does it
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make a Panglossian claim that profit and public interest can perfectly
coexist. Instead, it-makes a more modest and achievable claim that
social intrapreneurship provides a discrete and practical approach for
bridging profit and social interest, and, as a result, it has key
implications for the broader corporate-purpose debate. Social
intrapreneurs' value-focused innovation is a means of modernizing
their host firm's approach to society at large, broadening the firm's
appeal towards future innovators joining the work force. Finally,
social intrapreneurship offers to the corporation and to society
potential advantages that are not necessarily present in other socially
focused corporate activities, such as charitable contributions,
corporate philanthropy, or stand-alone CSR initiatives.
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APPENDIX
237
Organization Intrapreneur Insight Socio-Profit Impact
Allianz Michael Created method to Business: The Micro-
Anthony provide the Insurance model expanded
"bottom of the Allianz's market share with
pyramid" with over two million customers
insurance, globally.
including accident, Societal: Offering
life, and health. insurance packages to
individuals that could not
normally receive such
protections but face natural
disasters, such as Tsunamis.
Accenture Gib Bulloch Created a Business: Accenture linked
nonprofit its core consultancy with
consulting model ADP's model to create new
called Accenture brokering functions that
Development further develops clientele
Partnerships and partnerships.
(ADP) that Societal: By combining
worked in concert Bulloch's nonprofit
with Accenture's consultancy with its
main business existing model, Accenture
model. can develop the value of
clients with societal impacts
through public/private
partnerships.
CEMEX Luis Sota Created a solution Business: Faced with
to address low- increased market
income housing competition, the launch of
needs by taking Patrimonio Hoy allowed
cement, CEMEX's CEMEX to enter into a new
existing consumer business segment, low-
product offering, income homebuilders, and
and developing a became CEMEX's most
model called profitable segment, making
Patrimonio Hoy to up 35% of Mexico's total
address local market for cement.
needs. Societal: Since Patrimonio
Hoy's launch, CEMEX has
helped nearly eight hundred
237 This table is adapted from "The Yunus Inside "-How Social Intrapreneurs Create
and Blend Societal and Business Value, along with intrapreneurs identified in the
SustainAbility report and stories based on research of the Aspen Institute's First Movers
program. See Heiko Spitzeck, "The Yunus Inside "-How Social Intrapreneurs Create and
Blend Societal and Business Value, tbl.2 (Dec. 14, 2010), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3
/papers.cfn?abstract id=1725254; SUSTAINABILITY, supra note 1; Aspen Institute First
Movers, supra note 17.
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Organization Intrapreneur Insight Socio-Profit Impact
thousand low-income
families in Mexico own
homes, and the company
plans to expand the model
in additional countries.
Coca-Cola Dan Vermeer Created a water Business: Since water is
sustainability crucial to Coca-Cola's
initiative utilizing products, reducing the risk
Coca-Cola's of water scarcity is critical
global brand to Coca-Cola's future
recognition and success and operations.
business system. Societal: Under Coca-
Cola's global reach, the
initiative provides a forum
for best practices as well as
risk- and value-sharing
solutions to address water
sustainability.
Dow Dawn Created Business: The approach
Chemicals Baker23 s  connection builds Dow's succession
between internal capability and contributes
leadership to the company's people
development and and organizational goals in
sustainable key employee-related
business models as fields, including Human
part of Dow's Resources Development
Human Capital and Training and
Planning and Workforce Planning.
Development Societal: This innovative
team. method allows Dow to
combine its power of
science and technology to
innovate what Dow views
as important for human
progress and development.
General Jonathan Founded GE's Business: Through the
Electric Murray 239  Research Circle Research Circle
Technology Technology business, GE
business as a way provides new solutions to
of utilizing the the health care industry.
company's Societal: By providing
238 2012 Class of Aspen Institute First Mover Fellows, ASPEN INST., http://www.aspen
institute.org/sites/default/files/content/upload/2009-2014_FirstMoverProj ects.pdf (last
visited Oct. 17, 2015).
239 GE Launches Company to Enhance Development of Innovative Technology in
Collaboration with Leading Scientists, BUSINESS WIRE (Sept. 9, 2011, 2:00 PM),
http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20110909005844/en/GE-Launches-Company
-Enhance-Development-Innovative-Technology#.VFOmuZPF800.
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Organization Intrapreneur Insight Socio-Profit Impact
scientists to tools, services, and
facilitate open solutions, the open-
innovation, innovation initiative allows
researchers to discover
potentially life-saving
knowledge faster.
Microsoft Orlando Ayala Launched the Business: By developing
Unlimited technologies that are
Potential Group to available and affordable in
offer affordable low-income and less-
technology to low- developed countries,
income market Microsoft is expanding its
segments. potential for future growth;
additionally, its worldwide
partners allow for
collaboration, and future
developers within the
corporation now consider
low-cost computer
compatibility when
developing new
technologies.
Societal: Expanding
technologies into less-
developed countries fosters
education, innovation, and
job opportunities.
Nike Sam Created a way for Business: With its Native
McCracken the brand to American Business, Nike
expand into new expands its revenue stream,
business territory reputation, and competitive
that leverages the edge.
power of the Nike Societal: By expanding the
brand with the business into the Native
goal of driving American community, Nike
athleticism in the continues promoting
Native American physical fitness worldwide.
community.
Pepsi Amy Chen 2 4  Created the Food Business: In addition to
for Good program building trust and equity
to leverage Pepsi's with consumers, the
food and beverage program acts as a research
expertise to solve and development incubator
240 Emily Bosland, How to Change the World and Still Pay Your Bills, FORBES (Jan.
22, 2013, 1:35 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ashoka/2013/01/22/how-to-change-the
-world-and-still-pay-your-bills/; see also Amy Chen, Food for Good, ASHOKA
CHANGEMAKERS, http://www.changemakers.com/intrapreneurs/entries/food-good-pepsico
(last visited Oct. 17, 2015).
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Organization Intrapreneur Insight Socio-Profit Impact
nutrition issues in to foster new, low-cost
underserved technologies to improve
communities. Pepsi's business.
Societal: Since its creation
in 2009, the program has
provided over one million
meals to at-risk youth
throughout the country.
P&G Win Sakdinan Created the Future Business: By educating
Friendly initiative consumers on green-
that educates friendly practices through
consumers on the use of P&G brand
sustainability products, the initiative
practices through increases both the
the use of P&G's availability of sustainable
products. products as well as P&G's
business.
Societal: The Future
Friendly initiative paves the
way for future business
leaders with a focus on
sustainability, as well as a
sustainability strategy that
benefits consumers and the
environment.
Siemens Mark Siebert Created Business: Following its
information creation, the German
technology Government now invests in
solutions for new forms of online
"corporate participation, expanding the
greening," citizen market on a global scale.
participation, and Societal: The IT4
e-democracy (its Sustainability Solution
"IT4 Sustainability allows citizens to use the
Solution"). Internet to participate in
democracy.
Starbucks Sue Created a Business: Through this new
Mecklenburg comprehensive approach to supply chain
program that management and best
connects the practices, Starbucks ensures
quality of the quality and responsible
Starbucks's procurement of its products.
products with Societal: The program sets
social, economic, forth key opportunities for
and environmental enhancing the livelihood of
standards, its suppliers while reducing
their environmental
footprint.
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Timberland Michael Created a tool for Business: Utilizing the
Fischer measuring Supply Chain Emission
emissions, Tracking tool reduces costs
tracking, and associated with off-setting
modeling to carbon emissions and
manage emissions potential carbon taxes.
from global Societal: By recognizing its
transportation of carbon emissions,
the brand's Timberland now reduces its
products. emissions through
optimizing global
transportation of its
products.
Unilever Santiago Created an Business: The "Brand
Gowland opportunity to Imprint" assessments of
engage consumers fourteen Unilever brands
and market incorporated its core
influencers in the business competencies in a
conversation about way that results in positive
sustainability brand innovation and
through "Brand impact.
Imprint" Societal: To introduce
assessments. consumers to the
sustainability conversation
and use Unilever's impact
to leverage engagement.
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